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Making  India's industrial  incentive  scheme  transparent  requires
making tariffs unifonmly  low and eliminating  all quantitative
restrictions on imports. Tariffs must be used only to provide
protection  and incentive  signals,  not to raise  revenues.
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Effective  protection  rates in India are so high and  The proportion  of projects  with a positive  profit
vary so greatly  that anything  short  of low  margin would  triple, from 20 percent  to 63
uniform  tariffs and the complete  elimination  of  percent.
quantitative  restrictions  would  not make the  Among  import-substituting  projects  that are
industrial  incentive  scheme  transparent,  as it  not candidates  for export  under the present  trade
needs to be.  regime,  under the proposed  new regime  half
Aksoy  and Ettori produce  evidence  to show  would  be candidates  for export  if they would
that there is ample scope for reducing  tariffs  and  procure  their inputs at intemational  prices.
quantitative  restrictions  and that most industries  Lower tariffs  would  fulfill their primary
could coexist  with much less protection  than  purpose  more  effectively:  providing  protection
they  now have.  and incentive  signals.  The function  of generating
By eliminating  all surcharges  on inputs  public revenues,  another  critical issue in India,
(tariffs  on imported  inputs,  price differentials  on  should  be fulfilled  not through  tariffs  but through
local inputs, nondeductible  excise taxes)  - even  more  efficient  and protection-neutral  instruments
without  correcting  for the effects  of high invest-  - in particular,  direct  taxation  (income  tax) and
ment costs  - most projects  (including  import-  nontariff  indirect  taxation  (neutral  excise taxes,
substitution  projects)  would  earn from current  MODVAT,  and preferably  the value-added  tax
intemational  prices a positive  profit  margin  on  on consumption).
theirmarginal as well as full production  costs.
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1.  India's  industrial  policy  environment  has  gone  through  major  cycles  of
tightening  and  relaxation  over  the  last  few  decades.  These  policy  shifts  have
been  caused  primarily  by  balance  of  payments  crises.  The  adjustments  to  the
BOP  crises  have to  a large  extent  been made  (a) on the  import side by increa-
sing tariffs  and restricting  imports via  various QRs  and (b)  by increasing
regulations  on industrial  investment, output adjustment and placing  other
restrictions  on  the  ability  of  firms  to  adjust  to  changing  economic  condi-
tions.  The  policy  apparatus  that  has  been  created  as  a  result  of  these  crises
have  not  been  dismantled  when  the  policy  regimes  have  been  relaxed.  Instead,
ad  hoc  adjustments  and  exemptions  have  been  introduced  as  special  schemes  to
ease  the  restrictions  and  resulting  bottlenecks.  As  a  result,  a  very  compli-
cated  policy  environment  has  been  created  with  overlapping  layers  of  control,
riddled  with  special  exemptions  and  schemes.  In  the  1980s  significant  reforms
were  implemented  in  areas  of  industrial  regulation  and  export  policies  that
eased  the  magnitude  of  bottlenecks  that  firms  and  exporters  face.  However,
the  reforms  in  the  import  regime  have  been  more  modest  and  the  complex  and
restrictive  structure  of  the  regime  has  continued  to  date.
2.  Net  effect  of  the  import  regime  has  been  a  gradual  shrinkage  of  inter-
national  trade  as  a  proportion  of  domestic  output  (Aksoy  and  Tang,  1991).
High  protection  given  by  QRs  and  increasing  tariffs  have  led  to  indiscriminate
import  substitution  and  very  high  product  prices  in  India  compared  to
international  prices.  On  the  other  hand,  specific  exemptions,  administered
pricing  of  key  inputs  and  uneven  domestic  competition  have  led  to  certain
product groups enjoying  very high effective  protection  while  other  product
groups having low or  negative effective  protection.  Furthermore, very  high
tariffs  and taxes levied  on investment goods to  protect  the domestic producers
have  eroded  the  competitiveness  of  even  otherwise  efficient  industries  and
require  modifications  in  the  interpretation  of  effective  rates of  protection.
3.  This  paper  tries  to  estimate  the  structure  of  incentives  and  effective
protection  and  its  implication  for  Indian  industry.  First,  the  rates  of
nominal  and  effective  protection  collected  from  various  studies  are  analyzed.
These  include  effective  protection  estimates  made  by  Pursell  (1988),  various- 2  -
BICP reports  and other  firm  level  information  collected  by  the  World  Bank  for
its  subsector  studies  and  projects.  Second,  the  effect  of  moving  to  a  free-
trade  environment  on  different  subsectors  is  analyzed  with  the  use  of  a  multi-
sector  computable  general  equilibrium  model.  The  firm  level  effective
protection  estimates  are  compared  with  the  simulations  obtained  from  the  CGE
model.  The  CGE  shows  that  the  higher  effective  protection  a  subsector  enjoys,
the  more  negatively  this  subsector  is  effected  by  moving  to  free  trade.  In
the  third  section  of  the  study,  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  protected
subsectors  are  undertaken  to  highlight  more  precisely  the  sources  and
structure  of  these  inefficiencies.
A. NOMINAL  AND  EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION  IN  MANUFACTURING
4.  There  are  serious  problems  in  estimating  effective  protection  rates  in
India.  Many  industries  are  effectively  autarkic  where,  depending  on  the
degree  of  domestic  competition,  domestic  prices  might  be  below  or  above  landed
prices  of  imports  (inclusive  of  tariffs).  In  this  context,  deregulation  has  a
very  important  effect  on  domestic  prices.  Easing  of  entry  barriers  in  many
subsectors  lead  to  a  rush  of  investments  and  eventually  to  the  creation  of
excess  supplies.  These  excess  supplies  lead  to  lower  prices  than  the  tariff
inclusive  prices  of  imports.  Thus  for  many  product  groups,  domestic  prices
are  much  lower  than  landed  (inclusive  of  tariffs)  import  prices.
5.  Another  reason  for  non-equalization  of  domestic  and  import  prices  is  the
implicit  or  explicit  price  controls  and  canalization.  Public  sector  supplies
a  large  portion  of  intermediate  goods  (especially  in  metals  and  chemicals)  and
thus  either  directly  controls  their  prices,  or  controls  the  prices  of  imports
through  public  sector  canalizing  agencies.  Supplies  of  many  of  these
commodities  are  also  rationed  to  actual  users.  Thus,  firms  needing  more
inputs  (both  imported  and  domestic)  than  supplied  by  the  rationing  system  have
to  import  the  difference  (either  directly  or  through  REP  licenses)  at  a  higher
landed  price.  In  other  products,  Government  agencies  import  the  products  at
high  tariffs  and  sell  at  a  price  that  is  lower  than  the  landed  price,  thus
cross  subsidizing  the  imports  through  charging  other  levies  on  domestic
production  (Pursell,  1988;  Aksoy,  1991).  This  is  prevalent  in  many
petrochemical  products.6.  EPRs  In  India  change  dramatically  over  time  because  of  the  pricing
policies  of  the  Government  for  major  intermediate  products.  By  the  nature  of
world  markets,  international  prices  of  intermediates  (metals,  chemicals,  etc.)
a-e  substantially  cyclical.  In  the  name  of  price  stability,  the  Government
adjusts  tariffs  on these products such that  the International  price  fluctu-
ations  are  not  passed  on  to  the  domestic  prices.  Since  ERP  estimates  are
based  on comparisons  of  domestic and international  prices,  certain  sectors
would show  widely  varying  ERP  estimates  depending  on  when  they  are  made.
7.  Nominal Protection.  The overall  effects  of  trade,  protection  and
regulatory  policies  for  industry  are ultimately  reflected  in  the comparative
prices  of  industrial  products  (domestic  ex-factory  prices  relative  to  inter-
national  prices,  before  taxes  charged  to  the  users,  i.e.,  realized
protection).  Some  500  price  ratios  between  domestic  ex-factory  prices  and  CIF
import  prices,  (nominal  protection  coefficients  NPC)  covering the period  1987-
1989, assembled  from  a  multiplicity  of  sources  (BICP  reports,  Bank  subsectoral
analyses, DFI-financed sub-projects)  are presented in  Table  1.  These  price
ratios  provide  a  reasonably  comprehensive  picture  of  the  level  of
competitiveness  of  Indian  industry  in  the  late  1980s.- 4  -
TABLE  1:I  NOMINAL  PROTECTION  COEFFICIENS  IN MANUFACTURING
PMOdI.qE  191§-19A1  9  I  9  8  Overall  Landed  Ilport  Prices  /a
Edible Oils  1.57  2.32  ---  2.11
Miscellaneous  Food  Products  1.13  2.26  (1989)
Total  Food  Industries  1.82
Cotton  Textiles  1.10  1.10
Synthetic  Textiles  2.53  2.09 1.73  2.16
Total  Textiles  1.77
Rubber  Products  1.80
Plastics  Products  1.57
Heavy  Chemicals  1.87  1.96 1.82  1.84  2.27  (1988)
Petrochems  Intermediates  2.31  2.47 1.98  2.19  2.30  (1989)
Synthetic  Fibers/Resins  2.17  3.38 1.68  2.32  2.23
Other  Chemicals  1.56  1.47
Total  Chemical  Industries  2.04  2.14
Iron/Steel  Products  1.51  2.08 2.01  1.74  1.89 (87-88)
Castings/Forgings  1.34  2.17 (87-88)
Non-Ferrous  Metals  (Aluminum)  1.23/b  2.09  (1987)
Total  Basic  Metals  1.54  2.08
Machine-Tools  1.57
Non-Electrical  Machinery  1.72  1.97  1.80
Electrical  Machinery  1.35
Total  Machinery  1.67
Electronics  and  Parts  1.58  1.19  1.37  1.49  1.63  (1988)
Motor  Vehicles  and  Parts  1.39  0.84  1.26
La  Coefficient  of  Landed  (inclusive  of  tariffs)  to  CIF  prices  for  imported  goods.
Lb  Mostly  Aluminum  products.
Note  1: Subsectoral  NPCs  are  unweighted  averages
Note  2: Seven  other  subsectors  with  less  than  6  observations  each  are  not  included  in  the  table.
8.  Some  products groups have a sufficiently  .arge number  of  price  compar-
isons  to  permit  the  estimation  of  annual  averages  for  1986-87,  1988  and  1989
separately.  The  trends  suggested  by  the  annual  averages  confirm  other  indi-
cations  derived  from  specific  subsector  knowledge:  - slightly  declining
relative  prices  for  synthetic  textiles,  synthetic  fibers  and  resins,  and
petrochemical  intermediates  and  stable  relative  prices  for  heavy  chemicals  and
machinery.  The  increasing  trend  for  iron/steel  products  is  due  to  the  shift
in  the  sample's  product-mix  over  the  period  1987-1989  from  mild  steel  to-5-
special  steels  and  alloys  which  have  much  higher  tariffs.  Table  1  also  shows
clearly  the  tremendous  variability  of  relative  prices  in  India  compared  to
international  prices.  Despite  significant  real  devaluation  since  1986,  Indian
ex-factory  prices  in  key  subsectors  such  as  metals,  machinery,  chemicals  and
other  engineering  products,  are  still  between  50%  to  100%  above  international
prices.  While  part  of  this  can  be  attributed  to  higher  taxes  and  tariffs  on
inputs,  it  also  probably  reflects  the  very  high  protection  given  to  these
industries  through  tariffs  and/or  QRs.
9.  Another  characteristic  of  the  trade  regime  is  that  the  tariffs  are  set
to  keep  the  landed  price  of  imports  above  the  domestic  prices.  Comparison  of
landed  import  prices  (inclusive  of  tariffs)  to  domestic  ex-factory  prices
shows  that  landed  import  prices  are  between  20%  to  50%  higher  than  the  domes-
tic  prices.  This  "water  in  the  tariff"  allows  domestic  producers  to  sell
their  products  first  (imports  take  place  only  if  the  domestic  supply  is  not
sufficient  to  meet  the  domestic  demand)l/  and  also  permits  them  to  invest  in
import  substitution  without  any  fear  of  import  competition,  even  if  their
investments  are  inefficient.  However,  these  high  tariffs  on  many
intermediates  and  capital  goods  increase  the  production  costs  of  user
industries  substantially.
10.  Effective  Protection.  The  combined  effect  of  realized  protection  on
inputs  and  outputs,  and  the  low  value  added  content  of  Indian  industry
(averaging  about  25%  in  domestic  prices)  have  generated  effective  protection
rates  (EPR)  that  vary  widely  between  and  within  subsectors  and  are  generally
high.  The  EPRs  also  fluctuate  significantly  over  time  due  to  changes  in
international  prices  which  are  not  fully  reflected  in  domestic  prices.  Given
the  low  value  added  content  of  Indian  industry,  small  deviations  between
domestic  and  international  prices  lead  to  large  changes  in  EPRs.  For  this
reason,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  mention  the  year  in  which  a  particular  EPR
estimate  is  made.  Table  2  presents  some  210  effective  protection  rates  (EPRs)
from  various  sources  grouped  into  16  product  categories.
1/  This  also  means  that  the  firms  which  are  growing  rapidly  and/or  need
more  inputs  than  what  is  allocated  to  them  at  lower  prices,  end  up
paying  higher  prices  for  their  inputs.TABLE 2  EFmCTIVE PROTECTION  RATES (Z)  IN MNUFJACTURING
Product  EPR  La  Lear  lb
Edible  Oils  85  1988
Cotton  Yarns  52  1986
Synthetic  Textiles  100
Plastic  Products  37
Heavy  Chemicals  68
Synthetic  Fibers/Resins  162
Iron/Steel  Products  72  1985/86
Castings/Forgings  72
Aluminum  Products  -16  1986
Hand  Tools  33  1987
Machine-Tools  21  1987
Non-Electrical  Machinery  64
Electrical  Machinery  42
Electronics  and  Parts  92
Motor  Vehicles  and  Parts  19
Bicycles  24  1986/87
/a Subsectoral  EPRs  are  unweighted  averages.
jb Year  to  which  pertain  the  large  majority  of  observations.
When  no  year  is  indicated,  the  observations  are  spread  over
1986-1989.
Note  1: 11  other  subsectors  with  lese  than  6  obeervations  are  not
included  in  the  table.
11.  The  levels  of  effective  protection  are  generally  high  and  suggest  that
the  structure  of  protection  grants  Indian  industry  ample  room  for  profits
and/or  inefficiency.  A  number  of  subsectors  receive  high  effective  protec-
tion:  edible  oils,  heavy  chemicals,  iron/steel  products,  castings/forging,
non-electrical  machinery,  electronics,  and  particularly  synthetic
fibers/resins  and  synthetic  textiles.  Few  other  subsectors  appear  to  have
lower  or  insufficient  effective  protection:  machine-tools,  hand-tools,
electrical  machinery,  motor  vehiclee  and  parts,  cotton  textiles,  and
particularly  aluminum  products.
12.  The  EPR  estimates  are  based  on  the  comparison  of  value  added  in  domestic
and  international  prices,  and  effectively  assume  that  capital  costs  are  the
same  in  all  countries.  Since  most  countries  do  not  levy  high  taxes  or  QRs  on
capital  goods,  this  assumption  is  a  reasonable  approximation.  However,  due  to- 7  -
the  high  capital  costs  in  India,  the  observed  effective  protection  rates  need
to  be  interpreted  with  caution.  India  is  almost  unique  in  levying  such  high
taxes  and  tariffs  on  capital  goods.  Most  other  countries  usually  exempt
machinery  from  import  duties  and  domestic  taxes.  For  example,  in  Brazil  which
has  had  very  high  protection  for  the  domestic  capital  goods  Industry,  the
tariff  collection  rate  in  1984  was  17%  in  non-electrical  and  11%  in  electrical
machinery.  In  Korea,  the  tariff  collection  rates  on  machinery  for  domestic
use  was  about  9%  during  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.  Tariff  collection
rates  on  machinery  for  export  use  was  negligible.  Even  in  Pakistan  (which  has
the  second  highest  overall  tariff  collection  rate  after  India),  the  tariff
collection  rate  on  machinery  was  15%  in  1987/88.  In  comparison,  the  average
tariff  collection  rates  on  machinery  in  India  were  about  75%  in  1983/84  and
67%  in  1987/88.  Higher  prices  for  capital  goods  (domestic  or  imported)  paid
by  Indian  firms  imply  that  their  value  added  should  include  a  larger  return  to
capital  (interest,  depreciation  and  return  on  equity).  This  contributes,
ceteris  paribus,  to  domestic  value  added  exceeding  the  value  added  in
international  prices,  and  to  positive  EPRs.  That  is,  the  firms  in  India  which
may  be  as  efficient  as  the  foreign  firms,  will  nevertheless,  show  higher
prices  and  EPRs.  Thus,  to  make  EPR  estimates  in  India  comparable  to  other
countries,  the  effects  of  higher  capital  costs  have  to  be  taken  into  account.
13.  Ettori  (1990),  has  collected  data  on  60  appraisal  reports  for  new
investments  prepared  by  ICICI and  IDBI  during  1988  and  1989.  The  data  on
these  project  appraisals  have  been  reestimated  to  separate  the  effect  of
capital  costs  on  EPRs.  This  data  should  be  interpreted  with  caution  for  the
following  reasons.  First,  the  parameters  and  data  used  in  project  appraisal
reports  tend  to  be  favorable  to  comparative  prices  (domestic  versus  CIF)  for
the  projects'  outputs.  Second,  the  projections  implicitly  assume  that  the
projects  will  be  operated  efficiently  to  minimize  production  costs  (inputs,
labor,  capacity  operating  ratio,  ... ).  In  practice,  actual  production  costs
are  often  higher  than  projected  during  -ppraisal,  and  domestic  ex-factory
prices  are  then  increased  as  much  as  permitted  by  domestic  competition  and  the
degree  of  protection  provided  by  the  QRs  and  tariffs.  Third,  in  many  cases
excise  (or  CVD)  taxes  on  inputs  that  are  reimbursed  under  MODVAT,  could  not  be
separated  from  input  prices.  So  the  input  prices  are  overestimated.  For
these  reasons,  actual  effective  protection  rates  are  underestimated  (see
Ettori,  1990  for  the  details  of  estimation).- 8  -
14.  The  level  of  EPR  just  sufficient  to  compensate  the  firms  for  higher
capital  costs  (sufficient  to  earn  a  return  on  investment  equal  to  that  under
free  trade)  is  termed  compensatory  effective  protection  rate  (CEPR).  It
should  be  mentioned  that  CEPR  is  not  affected  by  the  data  problems  mentioned
above.  Table  3  presents  the  EPRS  and  CEPRs  for  different  subsectors.  The
difference  between  the  actual  EPR  and  the  compensatory  EPR  is  termed  Net  EPR
and  measures  the  protection  given  to  firms  above  the  level  necessary  to
compensate  for  higher  capital  costs.
TABLE  St  COMPENSATORY  AND  ACTUAL  EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION  BY SUBSECTOR  la
No.  of  Actual  Net
Subsector  Firms  CEPR (X)  EPR  EPR
Heavy  Chemicals  9  41  69  28
Light  Chemicals  3  49  -6  -55
Synthetic  Yarns  3  60  77  17
Basic  Steel  Products  7  46  72  26
Electronics  8  24  95  71
Food  Products  4  41  52  11
Other  Engineering  14  49  -11  -60
Miscellaneous  (Tires,  Paper)  5  37  61  24
Total  53  42  46  4
/a  The averages  are  unweighted  averages.
Sourcet Ettori,  1990.
15.  Table  3  shows  that  a  large  portion  of  the  high  observed  EPRs  are
actually  a  compensaltion  for  the  high  investment  costs  in  India.  Between  20-
60  percentage  points  of  observed  EPRs  are  just  a  compensation  for  high  capita'
costs.  Since  the  estimates  of  EPRs  for  the  overall  manufacturing  sector  are
around  40X,  most  of  that  protection  is  just  a  compensation  for  high  capital
costs  (World  Bank,  1989). The  protective  system  on  average  does  not  give
high  net  protection  to  the  industrial  sector.  However,  the  variability  of  net
EPRs  among  different  firms  is  so  large  that  about  half  of  the  firms  receiveexcessive  protection,  while  the  other  half  receive  negative  net  protection.
In  the  process,  the  average  ex-factory  price  of  output  in  this  sample  is
higher  than  international  prices  by  more  than  40%.
16.  Table  3  also  shows  that  sectors  producing  basic  intermediates  have
generally  higher  net  EPRs  than  downstream  products.  For  example,  basic
chemicals,  basic  steel  products,  synthetic  yarns  and  miscellaneous  products
(which  are  also  basic  inputs  such  as  tires,  paper,  etc.)  have  high  and
positive  net  EPRs  while  downstream  firms  in  engineering,  machine  tools,  light
chemice:s  have  low  or  negative  net  EPRs.  Again  these  subsectoral  averages
have  large  variations.  The  only  exception  is  the  electronics  industry  which
was  recently  deregulated  and  is  meeting  a  pent-up  demand  for  its  products.
More  recently  the  prices  and  EPRs  in  electronics  have  started  coming  down  as
these  demands  are  satisfied.
17.  In  conclusion,  the  multiplicity  of  tariff  and  tax  rates,  special
exemptions,  special  schemes  and  varying  degrees  of  domestic  competition  have
created  a  structure  of  effective  protection  which  has  large  variability  across
firms  and  industries.  However,  it  is  a  structure  that  gives,  on  average,  much
lower  net  protection  to  the  firms  while  substantially  increasing  the  average
cost  of  production.
B.  SIMULATING  FREE  TRADE
18.  The  EPRs  sunmnarized  in  the  previous  sections  indicate  that  the
production  of  key  intermediates  are  relatively  more  inefficient  and  tend  to
have  higher  EPRs.  This  conclusion,  however,  is  based  on  a  sample  of  products
and  may  not  generalize  if  the  whole  economy  is  taken  into  account.  To  observe
the  economy-wide  effects  of  protection,  input-output  tables  are  usually  used
to  estimate  effective  protection  rates.  These  static  estimates,  however,  do
not  take  into  account  the  macroeconomic  adaustments  that  accompany  changes  in
the  level  of  protection.  Moving  to  a  free  trade  environment  (i.e.,  elim-
ination  of  protective  tariffs  and  QRs)  will  effect  individual  subsectors
through  two  channels.  First  is  the  effect  of  changes  in  relative  prices
caused  by  the  changes  in  protection.  The  secotid  effect  is  caused  by
macroeconomic  adjustments  that  are  required  to  compensate  for  the  tariff  and
QR  changes  and  maintain  internal  and  external  balances.  The  Indian  Government- 10  -
receives  close  to  one-third  of  its  revenues  from  import  tariffs  and  lowering
of  tariffs  and QRs  would effect  external  and internal  balances  requiring
adjustments in  public  expenditures,  other  taxes and  exchange  rates.  Ideally,
the  simulation  of  reduced  protection  should  assume  that  all  trade  taxes  are
removed  and  compensating  fiscal  adjustments  are  made  through  lump-sum  taxes.
In  this  study,  a  more  realistic  and  therefore  theoretically  less  correct
adjustment  is  assumed.  First,  the  protective  tariffs  are  assumed  to  be
lowered  to  a  uniform  20%  rather  than  to  zero.  This  is  because,  for  a
considerable  amount  of  time,  the  revenue  from  tariffs  will  be  required  in
India.  Second,  the  QR  premium  is  assumed  to  be  a  uniform  25%  and  all  QRs  are
assumed  to  be  eliminated.  Third,  MODVAT  is  extended  to  allow  those  sectors
registered  under  MODVAT  to  claim  full  credit  for  excise  and  CVD  paid  on
capital  goods  against  their  output  tax  liability.
19.  This  simulation  is  made  using  a  72-subsector  general  equilibrium  model
developed  by  Mitra  and  Go  (1991)  using  the  database  for  1987/88.  The  model
has  an  integrated  macro-fiscal  and  micro-sectoral  perspective  and  attains
micro  and  macro  equilibrium  simultaneously.  It  is  capable  of  tracing  the
effects  of  policy  changes  on  the  major  macroeconomic  aggregates  and  deriving
the  impact  of  tax,  tariff  and  expenditure  changes  on  output,  value  added,
prices  and  real  rates  of  return  on  the  disaggregated  sectors  of  the  economy.
(See  Mitra  and  Go,  1991 for  details  of  the  model.)
20.  These  adjustments  are  simulated  to  achieve  balance  of  payments
neutrality,  i.e.,  maintaining  the  existing  current  account  deficit.  Foreign
savings  is  therefore  given  and  domestic  savings  must  adjust  to  ensure  equality
between  total  savings  and  investment.  Domestic  savings  may  be  raised  either
by  cutting  public  expenditure  or  by  increasing  tax  revenue  with  fixed  public
expenditure.  Maintaining  the  current  account  deficit  with  tariff  cuts
requires  a  tightening  in  the  management  of  domestic  demand.  While  this  can  in
practice  be  brought  about  through  a  range  of  instruments  including  monetary
policy  and  administered  prices,  the  focus  here  is  on  fiscal  adjustment.  The
first  alternative  is  to  raise  excise  taxes-cum-CVD  while  keeping  government
expenditure  constant  in  real  terms.  In  the  second  alternative,  the  government- 11  -
reduces  domestic  demand  by  cutting  its  own  expenditures,  both  current
consumption  and  public  sector  investment.2/
21.  Table  4  summarizes  the  industry  specific  effects  of  moving  to  lower  and
uniform  tariffs  and  eliminating  QRs.  The  magnitude  of  the  output  changes
summarized  below  should  be  treated  with  caution  since  the  model  does  not
incorporate  the  effects  of  endogenous  technological  improvements  that  would  be
induced  by  greater  openness  to  the  world  economy.  Changes  in  output,
therefore,  should  be  treated  as  illustrative,  indicating  the  direction  of
change  and  highlighting  the  sub-sectors  that  will  be  affected.
2/  Both  alternatives  are  potentially  contractionary.  The  price  deflation
caused  by  fiscal  contraction  must  be  accompanied  by  a  reduction  of
nominal  wages  in  order  to  keep  real  wages  from  rising  to  values
incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  base  year  levels  of  employment.
Since  nominal  wages  of  many  workers  are,  however,  sticky  downwards,  an
exchange  rate  devaluation  is  required  to  raise  prices  and  hence  prevent
an  increase  in  real  wages  inconsistent  with  equilibrium  In  the  labor
market.  The  latter  equilibrium  would  have  been  brought  about  without
policy  intervention  if  wages  were  flexible  downwards.- 12 -
TABLE  4:  SUBSECTORAL  EFFECTS  OF FREER TRADE
(1  Change)
Expenditure  Adjustment  Tax  Adiustment
Gross  Rate  of  Gross  Rate  of
Output  Return  La  Output  Return  la
AGRICULTURE  0.8  0.8  0.0  0.0
ENERGY  0.7  0.7  -2.8  -2.8
MANUFACTURING  -2.6  -1.9  -4.8  -4.1
Food,  Beverages  and Tobacco  -0.8  0.0  -2.6  -1.8
Leather  and  Textiles  7.1  7.1  2.1  2.2
Petroleum  and  Coal  Products  1.6  0.8  -0.4  -1.6
Chemicals  -6.7  -5.0  -8.9  -7.2
Non-Metallic  Mineral  Products  6.9  6.9  6.6  6.7
Metals  -15.3  -13.9  -15.7  -14.2
Metal  Products  0.3  0.4  -1.3  -1.2
Machinery  -16.6  -14.9  -16.4  -14.5
Electrical  Appliances  -4.4  -4.5  -7.4  -7.5
and  Electronics
Transport  Equipment  -1.8  -1.0  -2.9  -2.2
Other  Manufacturing  -5.4  -3.8  -6.5  -4.9
CONSTRUCTION  -1.1  -1.1  0.9  0.9
SERVICES  2.0  1.7  0.7  0.4
TOTAL  -1.0  0.0  -2.2  -1.3
Source: Mitra  and  GO (1991).
/a  Gross  profit  margin  on output.
22.  The  results  suggest  that  the  manufacturing  sector  as  a  whole  contracts.
Part  of  this  contraction  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  manufacturing  sector  is
highly  protected  and  this  protection  is  removed.  An  equally  important  part  is
that  most  of  the  indirect  taxes  are  levied  on  the  manufacturing  sector.  In
agriculture,  for  example,  lower  protection  is  coupled  by  high  subsidies  that
are  not  eliminated  in  these  simulations.3/  Despite  the  limitations  of  the
simulations,  the  results  presented  in  Table  4  on  manufacturing  subsectors  are
quite  consistent  with  the  conclusions  of  the  firm-level  EPRs.  The  three
3/  In  India,  the  manufacturing  sector  is  both  protected  and  taxed,  while
agriculture  is  disprotected  and  subsidized.  In  this  experiment,
protection  is  removed  but  taxes  and  subsidies  are  left  intact.- 13  -
hardest  hit  sectors  are  machinery,  metals,  and  chemicals,  indicating  that
these  subsectors  have  the  greatest  inefficiencies  and  are  highly  protected  by
the  existing  trade  regime.  Export  oriented  industries  such  as  textiles  and
leather  and  non-metallic  mineral  products  (gems)  expand  as  a result  of  changes
in  relative  prices.
23.  Table  4  also  shows  that  the  type  of  compensatory  fiscal  adjustment  (tax
increases  or  expenditure  cuts)  make  a  significant  difference  on  what  happens
to  different  industries.  Public  expenditure  cuts  primarily  fall  on
construction.  The  excise  tax  increases,  on  the  other  hand,  fall  primarily  on
the  manufacturing  sector.  This  is  because  government  expenditures  are
concentrated  on  services  and  construction  while  central  excise  taxes  are
mainly  levied  on  manufactured  goods.  Therefore,  the  reduced  protection  and
fiscal  adjustment  through  tax  increases  penalize  the  manufacturing  sector  in
two  ways. Intermediates  and  capital  goods  are  affected  through  lowered
protection  while  consumer  goods  are  penalized  by  higher  excise  tax  rates.
This  is  the  reason  overall  profitability  of  the  manufacturing  sector  declines
by  4.1%  under  tax  increases  but  declines  only  1.9%  under  expenditure  cuts.
24.  These  simulations,  despite  their  limitations,  supply  additional  evidence
that  the  trade  regime  protects  basic  intermediate  products  and  capital  goods.
The  consumer  goods,  which  are  also  highly  protected  both  by  tariffs  and  import
bans  seem  to  have  lower  protection.  The  uneven  subsectoral  impact  of  reducing
protection  can  be  traced  both  to  the  structure  of  external  protection  and  to
the  uneven  impact  of  deregulation  in  the  domestic  industry.  In  many
instances,  despite  high  external  protection,  greater  domestic  competition  and
ability  to  modernize  production  facilities  have  allowed  firms  to  be  more
competitive  and  not  utilize  the  full  protection  afforded  by  the  tariffs  and
QRs. Ah'luwalia  (1991)  shows  that  the  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth
in  the  1980s  has  been  highly  uneven.  While  TFP  has  grown  at  6.0%  p.a.  for
consumer  goods,  it  has  grown  3.4%  p.a.  for  capital  goods  and  only  1.4%  p.a.
for  intermediate  goods. These  numbers  are  again  consistent  with  higher  EPRs
observed  on  basic  intermediate  goods  producing  sectors.- 14  -
D. DEVELOPMENTS  IN SELECTED  SUBSECTORS
25.  Industrial  regulatory  reforms during  the  1980s  have introduced more
competition  between  domestic  firms  by  relaxing  regulations  on  capacity
licensing,  production  levels,  and  prices.  These  reforms  have  had  important
effects  in  a  number  of  subsectors  where  realized  protection  has  been  lower
than  that  afforded  by  the  trade  regime.  At  the  same  time,  both  the  firm  level
EPRs  and  model  simulations  outlined  in  the  previous  sections  indicate  that  the
core  input  supplying  sectors  of  the  economy  are  highly  protected  and
relatively  inefficient.  This  section  first  presentr  "  few  examples  where
liberalization  of  the  regulatory  environment  has  led  to  increasing  efficiency.
In  the  second  part,  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  core  sectors,  i.e.,  steel,
petrochemicals  and  capital  goods  is  undertaken  to  identify  more  precisely  the
sources  of  inefficiency  in  these  subsectors.  It  should  be  pointed  out  that
the  information  for  these  subsectors  is  highly  uneven  across  different  product
groups.  Therefore,  the  analyses  are  partial  and  focus  on  product  groups  where
the  information  is  available.
26.  One  successful  example  of  liberalization  has  been  the  cement  subsector.
Prior  to  1982,  this  subsector  was  highly  regulated,  ex-factory  prices  were
controlled,  and  plants  were  obliged  to  sell  a  part  of  their  production  to  the
public  sector  at  a  below-market  "levy"  prices.  As  levy  prices  failed  to  keep
pace  with  rising  input  costs  (e.g.,  energy),  the  price  controls  had  an  adverse
impact  on  the  subsector's  profitability.  Moreover,  investments  in  cement  were
constrained  by  restrictive  capacity  licensing  policies,  particularly  towards
MRTP  companies,  and  by  the  levy  sale  exemptions  granted  to  mini  cement  plants.
In  addition  the  freight  equalization  scheme,  introduced  in  1956  to  permit
uniform  cement  prices  throughout  the  country,  distorted  decisions  regarding
plant  location.
27.  The  reforms  adopted  in  1982  included  gradual  reduction  and  elimination
of  the  levy  cement  obligation,  a  concomitant  complete  decontrol  of  prices,
elimination  of  the  freight  equalization  scheme,  significant  relaxation  of
Investment  licensing  and  entry  of  MRTP  firms,  and  easing  in  foreign  technology
transfers  and  collaborations.  The  response  of  the  cement  subsector  to  liber-
alization  was  impressive.  Investment  and  production  accelerated,  price
increases  in  deficit  regions  brought  further  investments  in  these  regions,  and- 15  -
the  domestic  market  become  very  competitive.  In  response  to  these  reforms,
the  relative  price  of  cement  increased  markedly  between  1982  and  1985  to  first
reestablish  the  industry's  profitability,  and  then  continuously  declined  by
about  18%  relative  to  the  wholesale  price  index.  Although  imports  of  cement
are  restricted  and  no  imports  have  taken  place  since  1986,  the  price  of  cement
in  India  is  presently  competitive  with  world  prices,  and  some  exports  are
taking  place.4/
28.  Liberalization  also  took  place  in  a  number  of  subsectors  producing
finished  goods,  such  as  Electronics  and  Motor  Vehicles  (including  2-Wheelers).
In  these  two  subsectors  investments  were  largely  delicensed  including  'broad-
banding"  of  the  product-mix,  and  foreign  technology  transfers  and  collab-
orations  were  made  easier  after  1984. Competition  between  numerous  domestic
firms  grew,  substantial  amounts  of  resources  were  attracted  in  these  sub-
sectors  for  investment,  and  production  growth  accelerated  in  conjunction  with
more  liberal  policies  for  imports  of  components.  Tariffs  were  rationalized
and  reduced  for  electronic  industries  (30%  on  raw  materials  and  45%  on  compon-
ents,  both  on  OGL,  and  75%  on  finished  products,  mostly  restricted).  The
liberalization  and  enhanced  competition  had  a  beneficial  impact  on  prices  in
these  two  subsectors,  where  prices  declined  not  only  relative  to  overall  manu-
facture  prices  but  also  in  absolute  terms  during  a  couple  of  years  in  1984  and
1985. The  impact  of  liberalization  of  domestic  production  and  imports  was
particularly  visible  in  the  electronic  industries.  Table  5  summarizes  a  few
key  indicators  in  the  electronics  subsector.
4/  It  should  be  noted,  though,  that  liberalization  of  this  subsector  was
facilitated  by  the  small  amount  of  imports  and  the  natural  protection
enjoyed  by  cement  due  to  transportation  costs.- 16 -
TABLE  5:  TRENDS  IN ELECTRONIC  INDUSTRIEI
1981  Am  M8  nu
- Number  of  Firms  179  467  590
- 4-Firm  Concentration  Ratio  (%):
Computers  90  43  52
Black 6  White Televisions  32  29  41
Printed Circuit  Boards  83  S0  54
- Value Added  Index (1980/81  prices)  100  143  393
- Share  of  Public Sector (%)  43  n.a.  n.a.  32
- Imports  as percentage  of  Output  36.7  50.8  45.8
- Price  Index:  Overall  100  102.5  95.7  82.6
Consumer  Products  100  85.0  76.5  80.0
Personal  Computers  n.a.  L/  100 La  41.7  16.7
Components  100  97.5  106.5  97.5
a  PCs  were  manufactured  in  1984  for  the  first  time.
Source:  Joseph  (1989).
29.  As a result  of the  liberalization,  output  in this  sector  has  grown  more
than  25X p.a. in real  terms  in  the 1980s. Relative  prices  have  declined  due
to  domestic  competition,  and the  share  of imports,  which  first  increased  due
to import  liberalization,  has started  to  decline  over  the last  few  years.
Similarly,  high  rates  of effective  protection  enjoyed  by this  sector  in the
late 1980s  started  to decline  recently.
30.  In the  automotive  subsector,  too,  competition  enhancement  through  deli-
censing  and  the  entry  of  modern cars  by  Maruti  (a  public  enterprise)  forced
enterprises  to  improve  their  products,  with  a  focus  on  quality,  and  to  fight
for  market  shares.  However,  the  absolute  protection  given  to automotive  prod-
ucts (imports  are  practically  banned)  and  the  absence  of  minimum efficient
scale  (MES)  thresholds  permitted  excessive  entry  of new firms  and  plants  with
inefficient  sizes  and investments  too small  to ensure  competitive  productivity
and  quality. Rationalization  of under-sized  inefficient  producers,  especially- 17  -
in  2-Wheelers  and  light  commercial  vehicles,  has  emerged  in  recent  wears.  This
is  expected  to  continue  until  the  structure  of  the  automotive  industry  and  its
capacity  are  rationalized  by  market  forces.
31.  By  contrast  with  the  subsectors  analyzed  above,  a  number  of  important
subsectors  providing  critical  raw  materials  and  intermediates,  such  as  iron
and  steel  and  heavy  chemical  industries,  did  not  receive  significant  liberal-
ization.  Three  subsectoral  groups,  basic  metals,  heavy  chemicals  and  machin-
ery,  (a)  provide  a  significant  share  (14%)  of  all  inputs  consumed  by  other
subsectors  of  the  economy;  (b)  constitute  a  substantial  share  of  fixed  invest-
ment (26%); and (c)  absorb a large  share of  imports  (39%).  The share of  these
three  subsectors in  inputs  of  some  key industries  is  given in  Table 6.
TABLE 6:  3-SUBSECTOR  INPUT SHAU  IN  TOTAL  INPUTS
Input  Coefficients  (1  of output)  3-Subsectors
Heavy  Basic  Machinery  as X of
Output  Subsector  Chemicals  Metals  and  Parts  Total  Inputs
Synthetic  Textiles  17.4  0.2  1.5  27.0
Plastic  Products  31.7  1.0  0.4  46.3
Pesticides  20.5  1.5  0.8  30.9
Paints  33.5  1.5  1.2  48.6
Drugs  18.5  1.4  1.2  31.1
Hardware  0.4  36.4  1.4  61.5
Metal  Products  0.8  42.5  0.4  66.8
Electronics  1.7  3.4  20.9  42.7
Rail Equipment  0.4  26.2  3.9  50.9
Motor  Vehicles  0.5  25.4  3.0  45.1
Bicycles  1.5  21.9  1.6  39.7
Other  Transport  Equipment  1.2  24.3  1.5  38.9
Miscellaneous  1.8  18.2  1.7  37.5
32.  Table  6  shows  that  the  share  of  these  three  subsectors  in  total  input
use  of  some  important  sectors  range  from  27%  in  synthetic  textiles,  to  45%  in
motor  vehicles  and  67%  in  metal  products.  Efficiency  and  pricing  of  these  key
input  supplying  sectors  will  essentially  determine  the  cost  structure  of  the
rest  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Unfortunately,  it  is  exactly  these  three
subsectors  that  have  the  highest  tariff  rates,  highest  relative  prices,  and
also  have  very  high  rates  of  effective  protection.  Furthermore,  it  is  these
three  subsectors  that  have  received  bulk  of  the  public  investment  funds  and- 18  -
have  increased  their  share  of  output  substantially.  The  issues  confronting
these  subsectors  are  discussed  below.
(a) Iron.  Steel  and  Ferro-Alloys
33.  Iron  and  steel  is  India's  most  important  manufacturing  subsector,
accounting  for  about  10%  of  manufacturing  output  and  value  added.  It  has  two
different  segments;  one  segment  produces  mild  steel  and  consists  mainly  of
integrated  steel  plants  (ISP),  and  the  second  segment  produces  special  steels
and  alloys  primarily  by  mini-steel  plants  (MSP).  The  ISP  segment  is  dominated
by  public  enterprises  Steel  Authority  of  India  Limited  (SAIL)  and  its
affiliates,  and  the  private  Iron  and  Steel  Company  Limited  (TISCO).  The
prices  of  mild  steel  products  are  regulated  through  the  Joint  Plant  Committec.
User  prices  of  domestic  mild  steel  which  were  competitive  in  the  early  1980s
shot  up  substantially  (by  about  50-60%)  above  international  prices  during  the
period  1982-1987.  This  was  due  to  the  appreciating  currency,  declines  in
international  prices  of  steel,  inefficiencies  in  public  sector  steel  plants
and  various  taxes  and  levies  placed  on  steel  products.  Price  increases  in
steel  jeopardized  the  competitiveness  and  export  potential  of  major  downstream
industries,  in  particular  engineering  and  capital  goods.  Recent  favorable
developments;  modernization  investments  and  increased  efficiency  in  public
ISPs,  price  restraint,  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  increasing
international  prices  of  steel  as  of  1988,  reversed  the  trend  of  comparative
prices,  and  domestic  prices  of  most  mild  steel  products  regained  some
international  competitiveness  in  1988-1989.  By  contrast,  high  protective
tariffs  for  special  steels  and  alloys  (110%  to  345%  nominal  tariffs  and  50-
60%  tariff  collection  rates)  and  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  of  such
steels  have  permitted  inefficient  MSPs  to  sell  their  products  at  prices  more
than  100%  above  international  prices  and  still  survive  despite  high  production
costs  stemming  from  their  suboptimal  capacities.  In  view  of  the  negative
impact  of  such  prices  on  downstream  industries  (automotives,  capital  goods),
the  Government  has  introduced  minimum  efficient  scales  (MES)  of  50,000  tons
p.a.  for  MSPs.  About  half  of  the  50  existing  special  steel  MSPs  have
capacities  above  this  MES.  Table  7  shows  the  structure  of  production  in  iron
and  steel  subsectors.- 19  -
TABLE  7t  IRON  AND STEEL  - STRUCTURE  OF PRODUCTION
Nild Steel  Special  Steels/Alloys
No.  Produc-  No.  Produc-
Plants  Capacity  tion  Plants  Capacity  tion
-----(OOOT)  ---------  (OOOT)-----
Integrated  Steel  Plants  (ISPa)
SAIL (Public  Sector)  La  6  8,600  6,800  2  130  120
TISCO (Private)  1  2,000  2,170  1  75  80
Mini-Steel  Plants  (MSPs)  150  3.000  2,760  50  1,800  800
Total  157  15,600  11,730  53  2,005  1,000
/a  Including  IISCO's  two  plants,  which  are  managed  by SAIL.
Notes  Capacity  and  Production  are  expressed  in terms  of saleable  steel.
34.  International  Trade  in  steel  is  now  confined  just to imports,  which
totalled  1,660,000  tons in  1988/89  including  about  100,000  tons  of special
steels  and  ferro-alloys. Exports  peaked  in  the late  1970s  (up  to 5% of
output)  when India  was  a low  cost  producer  of steel,  and vanished  after  1982
when  domestic  production  costs  became  uncompetitive.  The  bulk  of imports  are
canalized  through  SAIL  and  other  public  bodies  while  a small  share  (about  10%)
is  available  under  Limited  Permissible  licenses.
35.  Protective  tariffs  in this  subsector  range  between  25% (metal  scraps)  to
110%  for  alloys  and 345%  for  stainless  steel,  with  a weighted  average  of 40%.
The  actual  collection  rate  for  protective  tariffs  and  excise  taxes  were 34%,
and  2% respectively.  These  collections  rates  were  respectively  24%  and  9% in
1973/74,  illustrating  the  trend  of increasing  tariffs  and  decreasing  excise
taxes.5/
36.  Prices  of mild (basic)  steel  have  been regulated  by the  Joint  Plant
Committee  (JPC),  which  comprises  the  secretary  of the  Steel  Department,
representatives  of all steel  producers,  and  a representative  of the Railways
Department. Since  the early  1980s,  when steel  price  regulations  were liber-
alized,  the  JPC has  set  the steel  prices  for ISP's  major  products  without  the
5/  The  collection  rates  vary  depending  on the  type  of product. For  metals
as a group,  the  protective  and  total  tariff  collection  rates  are 71%  and
81% respectively. In  ferrous  metals,  these  rates  are 66%  and  73%
respectively.- 20 -
Government's  formal approval.  The  JPC-set prices  comprise a retention
(producer) price,  and various taxes and levies  (for  the Steel  Development
Fund,  the  Freight  Equalization  Fund,  and  the  Engineering  Goods  Export
Assistance  Fund)  which  increase  user  prices  30-35%  above  producer  prices.  The
producer  prices  are  determined  on  a  cost-plus  basis  to  allow  for  a  reasonable
return  on  investment.  Such  administered  prices  have  not  given  adequate
incentives  for  improved  performance  and  modernization,  and  have  diluted  the
competition.  Despite  pressures  from  major  steel  consumers  like  railways,
steel  prices  experienced  a  rapid  increase  over  1975-1985  (11%  p.a.)  which
slowed  down  slightly  in  recent  years  (8.5%  p.a.  over  1986-1987).
37.  Prices  of  domestic  mild  steel,  which  were  competitive  up  to  the  early
1980s,  increased  markedly  above  international  prices  in  the  mid-1980s.  Due  to
increased  efficiency  and  price  restraint,  real  depreciation  of  the  exchange
rate,  and  increasing  international  prices  of  steel,  Indian  prices  of  most  mild
steel  products  now  appear  to  be  closer  to  international  prices.  The  price
ratios  (ex-factory  to  FOB  prices)  are  presented  in  Table  8.
TABLE  6t NPC. FOR  STEE PROUDCTS
MlId Steel  Sgecial St  ll/Al  loyv
Product  1980  1985  198S  1989  Product  Mid-1988
Wire  Rods  0.7  1.88  1.06  0.91-1.00  Cutting  Steel  2.6-2.7
Plates  0.64 1.50 1.04-1.11  0.92-1.18  Stainless  Steel  1.6-2.9
HR  Coll*  0.88 1.69 1.05-1.10  1.09-1.14  Spring  Stool  2.64
CR  Coils  0.98 1.72 1.02-1.16  0.94-0.95  Ball-Baring  Steel  2.24
Galvanized  Plates  0.98 1.84  0.92  N.A.  Alloy  Steels  2.2-2.8
Sources:  - Industrial  Costs  and  Prices,  CEI  Study  (August  1988).
- International  Competitiveness  of  Indian  Steel  Industry,  Arvind  Pande  (1989).
- Economic  Time,  August  12,  1988.
38.  On the other  hand, prices  of  non-ISP producers,  (in  particular  mini-
steel  plants)  and  special  steels/alloys,  are  unregulated  and  determined  by  the
conditions  of  highly  competitive  domestic  markets  (except  for  ferro-chrome);
taking  into  account  the  import  restrictions  (canalization)  and  the  high
protective  tariffs  for  special  steels  and  alloys  (110%  to  345%  nominal
tariffs,  and  50%  to  160%  tariff  collection  rates).  Given  the  permanent
shortage  of  special  steels  on  the  market,  domestic  prices  have  been  driven  by- 21  -
landed  prices  (after  duties)  of  imports  and  have  generally  been  more  than  100%
above  international  prices.  One  exception  is  Ferro-Silicon,  where  the  recent
doubling  of  inteinational  prices  (from  US$500  to  US$1,000  per  ton)  made  Indian
prices  competitive.
39.  As  a  result,  the  profitability  has  been  high  for  mini-steel  plants,
particularly  for  those  with  production  capacities  above  50,000  tons  p.a.
Financial  results  for  a  sample  of  9  MSPs  indicate  net  profit  to  net  worth
rates  ranging  between  12%  to  52%  and  dividend  rates  of  3  to  15%.  On  the  other
hand,  most  MSPs  with  small  furnaces  and  obsolete  technologies  have  mediocre
financial  results.
40.  The  analysis  of  the  production  cost  structures  presented  in  Table  9
indicates  high  efficiency  of  raw  materials  use  and  good  profits  in  TISCO  (the
only  private  ISP)  as  compared  to  SAIL  and  MSPs.  Among  mini  steel  plants,  the
efficiency  and  cost  structures  vary  greatly  depending  on  the  capacity
utilization  which  in  turn  is  dictated  largely  on  availability  of  power,  a
critical  input  for  MSPs.
TABLE  9:  PRODUCTION  COST STRUCTURES
SAIL  TISCO  MSPs  (1988/89)
(1987/88) (1988/89)  Range (in  t)  Average  (1)
Raw Materials  43  3  40  25-62  46
Energy  9  ]  15-46  18
Labor  14  ]  40  3-12  9
Other Inputs  23  ]  9-28  20
Interest/Depreciation  11  20  5-19  7
Total Costs  100  100  100  100
Gross Profit (1 Output)  -1.0  11.0  6-11  9.5- 22  -
41.  Effective  Protection  also  varies  widely  between  the  types  of  plants
(ISPs  versus  MSPs),  products  (flat  versus  long  prodiucts)  and  steel  quality
(mild  versus  special  steels/alloys).  Table  10  assembles  the  fragmentary,  and
largely  outdated,  available  data  on  EPRs.
TABLE  10:  EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION  RATES
Product  Year  NPC  EPR
Output  Input  a  )
ISP:  SAIL (public)  1985  1.30  0.89  74
ISP:  TISCO (private)  1985  1.31  1.11  51
MSPs (Mild  Steel)  1985  1.43  1.35  32
CR Coils  1985  1.61  0.89  112
CR Coils (MSP)  1987  1.70  1.52  174
Galvanized  Plates/Sheets  1988  1.68  1.66  93
Sources: Pursell  (for  1985)  - DFI subproject  appraisal  reports.
The  value  added  content  in  ISPs  is  high,  averaging  about  50%. It  should  be
noticed  that  the  EPR  for  SAIL  is  higher  than  for  TISCO,  due  to  the  former's
access  to  inputs  (coal,  iron  ore)  at  preferential  prices.  The  value  added
content  is  quite  low  in  MSPs. For  example,  the  basic  production  parameters
and  prices  for  an  MSP  project  to  produce  cold  rolled  (CR)  coils  in  the  late
1980s  are  as  follows:
Prices  (Rupees  Per ton)
Domestic  CIF  NPC
Output: CR Coils  14,750  8,950  1.65
Inputs: HR Coils (Local)  8,380  5,710  1.47
HR Coils (Imported)  10,700  5,710  1.87
Value  added  share  in output  at international  prices: 16Z
42.  It  is  quite  likely  that  effective  protection  has  decreased  in  the  mild
steel  ISPs  during  recent  years  with  the  increased  competitiveness  of  steel
prices.  Prices  for  the  major  inputs  (iron  ore,  coke)  expressed  in  foreign
exchange  (US$)  have  remained  largely  constant.  On  the  other  hand,  prices  of
major  mild  steel  products  (rods/bars,  plates/sheets,  HR  coils)  expressed  in
foreign  exchange  have  come  down. Under  such  circumstances,  the  EPR  of  SAIL
may  presently  be  about  30%  and  that  of  TISCO  around  10%. In  view  of  the  high
protection  and  prices  of  their  output,  effective  protection  in  special
steel/alloy  producing  MSPs  most  probably  remains  high. However,  the23 -
information  base  on  special  steels  and  alloys  is  incomplete  and  does  not  allow
more  precise  analysis.
43.  Conclusions.  These  results  indicate  that  in  mild  steel  products,
protective  tariffs  can  be  reduced  to  20-30%  range  without  significant  effects
on  the  viability  of  most  of  the  existing  enterprises.  Furthermore,  their
imports  can  also  be  placed  under  OGL.6/  The  information  on  special  steels  is
less  clear,  but,  except  for  very  inefficient  MSPs,  about  half  of  the  firms  can
survive  with  much  lower  tariffs.  Given  the  small  amount  of  labor  and  capital
in  a  special  steels  and  their  importance  in  engineering  and  especially  capital
goods  production,  exit  of  the  very  inefficient  producers  can  be  seriously
considered.  Furthermore,  special  rehabilitation  packages  can  be  introduced
for  the  more  efficient  firms.
44.  In  non-ferrous  metals,  the  situation  is  also  mixed  and  the  information
is  not  available  on  a  consistent  basis.  Aluminum,  which  has  the  biggest
share,  is  now  produced  at  very  close  to  world  prices.  However,  in  items  such
as  copper,  domestic  prices  are  significantly  higher  than  the  international
prices.  In  other  products,  India  is  a  net  large  importer  and  most  of  the
tariffs  are  purely  for  revenue  purposes.
45.  Casting,  forging  and  foundry  subsectors  have  not  been  analyzed  in
detail.  However,  the  existing  firms  in  these  subsectors  will  probably  have
more  serious  problems  than  the  mild  steel  producers.  The  protective  tariff
collection  ratio  for  this  subsector  is  around  80%,  and  many  firms  operate  with
outdated  technologies.
(b)  Petrochemical  Industry
46.  Though  relatively  small within manufacturing  (about 1.5 to 2%  of
manufacturing  output  and  value  added),  this  complex  subsector  is  important  for
a  number  of  reasons.  First,  it  has  been  growing  very  fdst  during  the  past
decade  and  is  attracting  large  investments.  Second,  its  products  have  a  wide
6/  In  1989  SAIL  proposed  to  reduce  the  tariffs  to  30  percent  and  place  all
mild  steel  items  on  OGL.  It  was  rejected  by  Department  of  Steel.- 24  -
variety  of  applications  as  intermediates  in  many  other  industries.
Petrochemical  products  can  be  broadly  categorized  as  follows:
(a)  primary  Intermediates/aromatics,  such  as  ethylene,  propylene,
benzene,  toluene,  styrene,  xylenes,  monoethylene  glycol  (MEG),
acrylonitrile  (ACN),  PTA,  DMT,  caprolActam,  which  in  turn  are  used
to  manufacture  secondary  products;
(b)  polyolefins  ("plastics")  comprising  principally  low  density  and
high  density  polyethylenes  (LDPE  and  HDPE),  polypropylene  (PP),
polystyrene  (PS)  and  polyvinyl  chloride  (PVC);
(c)  synthetic  rubbers,  such  as  styrene  butadiene  rubber  (SBR)  and
polybutadiene  rubber  (PBR);  and
(d)  synthetic  fibers  such  as  nylon,  acrylic  staple  (ASF)  and  polyester
staple  (PSF).
47.  Existing  structure  of  production,  and  ownership  are  presented  in
Table  11:
TABLE  11:  PETROCHEMICAL  INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE  OF PRODUCTION
Product  Group  Capacity  Output  Imports  Ownership  Pattern
(OOOT)  Public  Jt/Prvt
Polyolefins  610  270  290  90?  10o
Aromatics/a  395  295  n.a.  12Z  88Z
Resins/Rubbers  50  35  25  60?  40?
Fibers  18O0b  150  5  --  100?
Detergents  195  n.a.  n.a.  152  85Z
/a  Including  benzene/toluene  capacity  and  output  of steel  plants.
Tb  Includes  only the  major  producers,  which  account  for  about  85? of
total  capacity.
48.  Government  regulations  are  pervasive  in  this  subsector.  Although  the
first  two  Indian  petrochemical  plants  (naphtha  crackers)  were  set  up  by  the
private  sector  in  1960s,  the  industry's  strategic  plants  providing  the
critical  'building  blocks"  (intermediates  and  aromatic  products)  is  dominated
by  the  public  sector.  Currently,  large  private  investments  are  entering  the- 25  -
industry.  The  sector  is  not  deregulated  and  licenses  are  needed  for  new
investments.  Moreover,  the  initial  policy  for  the  subsector's  development  was
for  import-substitution  aimed  at  serving  a small  domestic  market.  As  a
result,  most  existing  plants  have  had  capacities  markedly  below  MESs  and
consequently  uncompetitive  production  costs.7/  In  addition,  the  Government
has  established  a  complex  and  ad-hoc  system  of  tariffs,  input  pricing  and
regulations  governing  most  intermediates  and  semi-finished  products  (e.g.,
benzene,  styrene,  xylenes,  caprolactam,  DMT,  PTA,  PSF,...).  Imports  of  many
products  affecting  the  sector  are  subject  to  QRs,  especially  canalization.
The  canalization  agencies  adjust  import  to  the  demand  gaps  unmet  by  domestic
production  and  supply  the  local  demand  for  many  products  at  regulated  prices
(i.e.,  weighted  averages  of import  and  cost-plus  domestic  prices).  These
regulated  prices  have  a loose  and  erratic  relationship  with  CIF  and  landed
(including  tariffs)  prices.
49.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  Government  charging  high  prices
for  the  basic  inputs  of  the  industry  (60-80%  above  international  prices  for
naphtha).  Existing  petrochemical  plants  have  been  based  on  naphtha  but  the
new  ones  are  to  be  based  on  both  naphtha  and  gas. Debate  has  been  going  on
for  the  last  two  years  on  the  price  of  gas  to  be  charged  for  petrochemical
plants.  Recently,  agreements  have  been  reached  to  charge  a  price  close  to
international  energy  equivalent  levels.
50.  Imports  of  petrochemical  products  have  been  determined  primarily  by
shortfall  in  domestic  production.  These  shortfalls  have  been  substantial  for
those  products  where  domestic  capacity  is  still  insufficient  to  meet  domestic
demand  (e.g.,  polyolefins),  and  represent  now  about  23%  of  domestic  output
(51%  in  value  after  duties).  Petrochemicals  are  thus  one  of  the  few  product
groups  for  which  imports  constitute  a  substantial  share  of  the  Indian  market.
Import  regimes  range  from  OGL  (e.g.,  polyolefins,  synthetic  rubbers,  MEG)  to
canalized  (e.g.,  naphtha,  benzene,  p-xylenes),  and  restricted  (e.g.,  ACN,  PA,
DMT). Imports  have  been  effectively  banned  for  products  with  sufficient  or
7/  In  order  to  avoid  the  recurrence  of  past  investment  patterns  and
creation  of  sub-optimal  capacities,  the  Government  now  imposes  minimum
efficient  scales  for  new  investment.  Furthermore,  many  of  the
suboptimal  plants  have  been  expanding  their  capacities  to  the  specified
MESs.- 26  -
excessive  domestic  capacity  (e.g.,  PSF,  linear  Alkyl  benzene  (LAB)  as  of
January  1988).  Substantial  progress  has,  however,  been  made  in  rationalizing
the  import  regime  for  polyolefins  (commodity  plastics)  which  have  been  placed
on  OGL  and  tariffs  lowered  and  made  more  even.
51.  Protective  tariffs  as  a rule  are  variable  and  high. After  declining  in
the  1970s,  the  tariff  and  excise  collection  rates  increased  markedly  from  87%
and  15%  in  1978/79  to  117%  and  24%  in  1987/88  respectively  and  are  now  among
the  highest.  Petrochemical  products  are  considered  "luxury"  products  and
taxed  according  to  Government's  revenue  needs.  Protective  tariffs  presently
are  about  50%  for  plastics,  65%  for  styrene,  about  85%  for  synthetic  rubbers
and  resins  and  benzene,  about  90-100%  for  xylenes  and  caprolactam,  150%  for
basic  building  blocks  (ethylene,  propylene  and  butadiene)  and  MEG,  and  195%
for  PTA  and  DMT. There  are  numerous  ad-hoc  rates  as  well  as  exemptions.
Since  international  prices  of  petrochemicals  are  highly  volatile,  Government
tries  to  adjust  the  tariffs  to  maintain  domestic  price  stability  and  the  level
of  protection.8/  However,  there  are  usually  lags  and  delays  in  these
adjustments.  In  any  case,  these  adjustments  usually  affect  either  some
segments  of  industry  or  downstream  users.
52.  Profitability  of  petrochemical  companies,  both  in  public  and  private
segments,  has  tended  to  vary  with  international  prices:  profitability  was
relatively  low  in  the  early  1980s  but  has  been  relatively  high  in  the  second
half  of  the  decade. IPCL,  the  leading  public  sector  firm  in  petrochemicals
and  the  dominant  one  in  the  sector,  has  recorded  high  profit  rates  (11% of
sales  and  16.5%  of  capital  employed  in  1987/88);  significantly  above  those  of
other  public  sector  firms.  The  same  pattern  has  prevailed  in  the  private
sector  (Table  12). Profitability  ratios  of  private  petrochemical  firms  have
been  significantly  above  industry  averages.
8/  For  example,  p-xylene  tariffs  were  lowered  in  1988;  plastics  tariffs
were  lowered  in  1988  and  1989  and  increased  again  in  1990.- 27 -
TABLE  12s  PETROCHEMICALS:  PRIVATE  SECTOR PROFITABILITY  RATIOS
1982-83  1985-86  1987-88
Basic Petrochemicals:
Gross Profit to Sales(Z)  6.7  14.7  13.0
Return on Capital(Z)  8.8  21.7  20.1
Plastics:
Gross Profit to Sales(Z)  11.0  12.9  13.3
Return on Capital(Z)  13.9  20.3  22.7
All Industries:
Gross Profit to Sales(Z)  10.5  10.5  9.6
Return on Capital(Z)  16.7  16.0  13.3
Source:  Financial Performance of Private Companies, ICICI.
53.  Other  sources  confirm  the  high  profitability  of  private  petrochemical
firms.  For  a  different  sample  of  9  large  companies  in  1988/89,  the  gross
profit  to  sales  and  return  on  capital  ratios  were  18%  and  22.3%  respectively,
yielding  a  net  profit  to  net  worth  ratio  of  27.3%.
54.  Effective  Protection  granted  to  the  industry  by  the  complex  system  of
import  quota  management  and  price  administration  has  been  high,  ranging  mostly
between  60%  and  177%. Table  13  summarizes  the  available  EPR  estimates  for
petrochemicals.  EPRs  relating  to  IPCL  are  based  on  actual  price  data  of 1987
(Pursell,  1988).  The  other  EPRs  are  derived  from  appraisal  reports  of  DFIs
for  their  1988/89  projects.- 28 -
TABLE 13:  PETROCEEHICALS  - EFFECTIVE PROTECTION  RATES
Product  Year  Nominal  Protection  Rate  Effective
Protection
Output  Inputs  Rate(Z)
IPCL:  PS  1987  144  217  64
LDPE  1987  102  116  90
PBR  1987  66  135  17
LAB  1987  67  50  177
DMT  1987  227  113  428
Overall  1987  110  41  225
EPDM  Rubber  1988  67  47  121
ABS  1989  77  73  86
Nitrile  Rubber  1989  77  82  68
Alpha-Olefins  1989  77  111  25
MA  1989  61  61  61
PA  1989  100  59  101
PO/PG/Polyols  1989  83  n.a.  135
Source: Pursel_  (1988),  DFIs.
55.  Existing  firm  level  data  has  been  reestimated  to  separate  the  effect  of
higher  prices  of  inputs  and  capital,  and  the  required  level  of  nominal
protection  to  compensate  for  these  high  prices  is  termed  "compensatory
protection."  Table  14  compares  the  official  tariffs  with  the  realized  nominal
protection  (ratio  of  domestic  to  international  prices)  and  the  level  of
nominal  protection  required  to  compensate  the  firms  for  the  high  costs  of
investment  and  inputs  (compensatory  protection)  in  India.- 29 -
TABLE  14:  PETROCMDI[CALS  - NOMIRAL  PROTECTION  RATES
Realized
Protective  Import  Protection  Compensatory
Product  Tariff  Resime  (NPR.Z)a  ProtectionCl)
Intermediates
p-xylene  115  Canalized  110  42
MEG  148  OGL  64  36
PTA  208  Restricted  75  31
DMT  210  Restricted  75  24
ACN  110  Restricted  70  28
Caprolactam  72  Canalized  68  16
ABS/b  145  Canalized  77  55
Alpha-OlefinsXb  95  OGL  77  82
MALb  115  OGL  81  47
PA/b  115  Canalized  110  32
Polyolefins
LDPE/LLDPE  57  OGL  14  43
HDPE  65  OGL  10  48
PP  50  OGL  20  32
PS  50  OGL  28  31
PVC  40  OGL  11  15
Synthetic  Rubber
PBR  100  OGL  66  19
Buta  Rubber  /b  85  Canalized  77  68
EPM  Rubber  /b  85  Canalized  67  44
Synthetic  Fibers
ASF  180  n.a.  137  24
PSF  213  Restricted  192  32
La  These  price  ratios,  valid for  one  point  of time (generally  in 1988),  are
only  indicative,  given  the  volatility  of domestic  and  international
prices  in recent  years.
/b  Projected  parameters  for  DFI  subprojects.
56.  The  domestic  prices  given  by  realized  protection  are  generally  lower
than  the  landed  prices  (CIF  plus  protective  tariffs)  and  in  turn  higher  than
the  protection  required  to  compensate  for  the  extra  costs  of  capital  and
inputs  (compensatory  protection).  Tariffs  contain  substantial  amounts  of
Nwaterw  introduced  largely  for  the  purpose  of  generating  public  revenue  from- 30  -
the  imports.  Despite  this,  domestic  prices,  resulting  from  the  regulatory  and
pricing  framework,  have  permitted  local  firms  to  earn  high  profit  margins.
The  cost  of  high  protection  has  been  passed  on  to  the  downstream  industries,
especially  to  the  synthetic  textiles  industry.
57.  Conclusions.  In  1988,  BICP,  at  the  request  of  Government  prepared  a
report  on  aromatics  subsector  giving  its  recow-mendatfons  on  future  tariff  and
import  policy  (BICP  19__).  The  BICP  recommendations  on  the  basic  building
blocks  of  petrochemicals  are:
*  The  existing  canalization  of  naphtha  and  fuel  oil  imports  should
continue  but  the  domestic  price  should  be  aligned  to  CIF  prices
plus  a  25%  import  duty.
Depending  on  the  long-term  price  of  naphtha,  tariffs  on  benzene
and  toluene  should  be  changed  from  0  and  85%  respectively  to  a
range  of  40%  to  55%.  These  commodities  should  be  moved  from  the
canalized  to  OGL-stock  and  sale  list.
P-xylene  and  o-xylene  tariffs  should  be  reduced  from  120%  and  125%
respectively  to  a  range  of  55%  to  70%.  They  should  be  shifted
from  OGL-actual  user  to  OGL-stock  and  sale  list.
58.  The  proposed  tariff  revisions  for  these  basic  intermediates  should  be
part  of  a  tariff  and  policy  reform  for  the  downstream  products  (e.g.,  DMT/PTA,
caprolactam,  PSF,  PFY,  NFY,...)  to  ensure  that  the  resulting  reduction  in
prices  of  aromatics  are  reflected  in  a  corresponding  decline  in  the  prices  of
these  downstream  products.
59.  According  to  the  estimates,  the  existing  polyolefin  plants  are  totally
naphtha  based  and  their  capital  costs  are  almost  fully  depreciated.  There  is
a  very  large  investment  program  being  undertaken  for  the  basic  petrochemical
industry  based  on  naphtha  and  natural  gas. Even  with  naphtha  prices  at  60-
80%  higher  than  CIF  prices,  the  bulk  of  the  existing  industry  can  coexist  with
average  protective  tartffs  of  about  40%.  Replacing  the  high  naphtha  price- 31 -
differential  by  an  equivalent  excise  tax  and  including  it  within  the  MODVAT
scheme  would  allow  the  Government  to  reduce  the  protective  tariffs  even
further.  For  new  gas  based  plants,  if  the  natural  gas  prices  are  set  at
international  energy  equivalent  levels,  even  with  high  capital  costs,  the
amount  of  protective  tariff  required  is  about  30%.9/ If  capital  costs  are
also  reduced,  the  protective  tariffs  could  be  reduced  even  further.
60.  In  other  chemical  based  industries,  the  situation  is  not  so  clear. In
inorganic  chemicals,  the  existing  average  protective  tariff  collection  rate  is
quite  low  (about  32%)  and  for  many  acids,  there  are  significant  natural
protection  due  to  high  transportation  costs.  However,  the  low  tariff
collection  rate  in  this  subsector  is  due  to  low  tariffs  on  phosphoric  acid  and
ammonia  which  are  inputs  into  fertilizer  production.  The  average  protective
tariff  collection  rate  for  other  inorganic  chemicals  is  about  100%. The
fertilizer  subsector  operates  with  very  low  tariffs  but  the  retention  price
system  for  each  enterprise  and  the  canalization  system  effectively  subsidize
the  inefficient  producers.
(c)  Capital  Goods Industries
61.  This  cluster  of  subsectors  producing  machinery and equipment  (both
electrical  and  non-electrical),  excluding  consumer  goods  and  durables  (motor
vehicles,  electrical  appliances,  and  electronic  goods),  have  traditionally
fulfilled  a  central  role  in  India's  development  planning  and  policies.  Indian
planners,  who had initially  identified  this  set  of  subsectors  to  be strategic
in  their  quest  for  economic self-sufficiency,  have promoted their  development,
notably  through  the  creation  of  new public  enterprises  (PEs) and the  take-
over  of  failing  private  engineering  firms.
16/  At  this  level,  the  firms  (IPCL)  still  have a profit  rate  60% higher  than
the  manufacturing  sector  average.- 32 -
62.  Capital  goods  industries  are  defined  herein  to  comprise  the  following
three  groups of  subsectors:
Non-Electrical  Machinery  Electrical  Machinery
- Agriculture  Machines  - Electrical  Industrial  Machinery
- Food/Textile  Machinery  - Electrical  Cables/Wires
- Other  Industrial  Machinery  - TeleCommunications  Equipment
- Machine-Tools  - Other  Electrical  Machinery
- Other  Non-Electrical  Machinery
Transport  Equipment
- Ship  Building
- Rail  Equipment
These  subsectors,  representing  10%  to  13%  of  manufacturing  output  and  value
added,  constitute  the  largest  group  of  industries  in  India.
63.  Structure.  The  production  structure  of  the  capital  goods  industry  is
presented  in  Table  15:
TABLE  15s  CAPITAL  GOODS: STRUCTURE  OF INDUSTRY
Public
Structure  (2)  Growth  (Z  p.a.)  Sector
1980181  1987188  1981-1984  1985-1988  Share(X)  /a
Non-Electric  Machinery  46  48  6.3  5.9  19
Electrical  Machinery  39  43  10.4  23.9  59
Transport  Equipment  15  9  7.1  6.9  36
TOTAL  100  100  8.0  13.1  37
as  2 of Manufac-  12.5  10.6  5.7  9.0
turing  Sector
/a  In 1984/85.
Growth  of  the  capital  goods  industry  accelerated  in  the  late  1980s  faster  than
that  of  the  overall  manufacturing  due  primarily  to  rapid  growth  in  the
electrical  machinery  sector,  especially  electronics  (computers,  telecom-
munications  equipment).  Growth  decelerated  in  the  more  traditional  sectors  of
non-electrical  machinery  and  transport  equipment.
64.  Role  of  Public  Sector.  About  40  central  government  public  enterprises
(CPEs)  have  been  operating  in  capital  goods  industries,  where  they  have  played- 33  -
a  preeminent  role  (particularly  in  electrical  machinery).  Most  CPEs  have  been
in  competition  with  their  private  counterparts,  except  in  a  few  capital-
intensive  products  (power  generators  and  turbines,  shipbuilding,  large
telephone  exchanges).
65.  CPEs  have  been  markedly  different  from  the  private  firms  in  following
respects:
(a)  CPEs  absorb  a  large  share  of  the  sector's  investments  (10-12%
above  their  output  share),  due  to  their  higher  capital  intensity;
(b)  labor  productivity  is  higher  in  CPEs,  however,  both  wages  and
labor  cost  per  unit  of  output  is  also  higher;  and
(c)  CPEs  have  been  reputed  for  poor  management  of  their  inventories.
This,  combined  with  their  higher  labor  costs,  has  eroded  the  CPEs'
profitability  well  below  that  of  private  firms.
66.  CPEs  can  be  divided  into  two  groups.  First  is  the  CPEs  that  were  set  up
by  the  Government.  Second  is  the  sick  private  firms  that  have  been  taken  over
by  the  Government.  Some  20  CPEs  (half  of  which  are  "taken  over"  firms)  have
been  incurring  cash  losses  (before  depreciation),  which  are  met  by  Government
advances  and  subsidies.  There  has  been  no  cash-losing  CPE  in  the  electrical
machinery  subsector.  The  cash-losing  CPEs  represented  about  20%  of  CPEs
output,  and  the  Government  subsidies  and  advances  represented  between  20  and
25%  of  the  output  of  cash-losing  CPEs.  The  profitability  of  public  and
private  firms  is  presented  in  Table  16:
TABLE  16:  PROFIT RATE  IN CAPITAL  GOODS  INDUSTRIES  In  1984185
(I  Of  Output)
Non-
Electrical  Electrical  Transport  Total
Machinery  Machinery  EZuiDment  Cagital  Goods
CPEs  -0.1  8.1  -4.1  -3.2
Taken-Over  Firms  -2.7  2.9  -12.7  -7.7
Others  (Private)  7.9  19.6  -0.7  10.4
Overall  6.4  12.7  -1.9  6.4- 34  -
Profitability  Trends
67.  Despite  the  low  profitability  of  the  CPEs,  capital  goods  industries  as  a
whole  have  had  higher  profitability  than  the  manufacturing  sector  as  a  whole.
The  profitability  ratios  for  capital  goods  industries  are  presented  in
Table  17.
TABLE  17: INDEX  OF  RELATIVE  PROFITABILITY  OF  CAPITAL  GOODS  INDUSTRIES  /a
1980/81  1982/83  1984/85  1985/86  1987/88
RBI  Survey:  Gross  Profit  to  Net  Assets  n.a.  1.31  1.08  0.88  1.30
Net  Profit  to  Net  Worth  n.a.  1.36  1.04  0.97  1.61
CMIE  Survey:  (Private  Sector):
- All  Capital  Goods:
Profit  to  Sales  1.59  1.56  0.94  0.92  1.27
Net  Profit  to  Net  Worth  1.76  1.65  0.63  0.71  1.19
-Electrical  Machinery:
Profit  to  Sales  1.66  1.26  0.80  0.61  1.20
La  Ratio  of  capital  goods  industries  profit  rate  to  average  profit  rate  in  other
manufacturing  industries.
68.  The  decline  in  relative  profitability  in  1984/85  and  1985/86  was  due  to
a  drastic  reduction  in  machinery  tariffs  to  45%  and  55%  respectively.  These
tariffs  were  increased  to  90%  in  1987/88.  However,  even  with  these  drastic
tariff  reductions,  the  profitability  of  capital  goods  only  declined  to  about
the  manufacturing  industry  average.  Since  then,  further  real  devaluation  and
tariff  increases  have  increased  the  profitability  of  domestic  capital  goods
producers  above  the  overall  manufacturing  industry  average.
69.  Protection  and  Trade.  QRs  on  capital  goods  appear  to  have  been
significantly  liberalized  during  the  1980s.  More  than  1,000  items  have  been
put  on  the  OGL  list. However,  the  industry  is  still  highly  protected.  First,
most  of  these  OGL  items  represent  products  not  manufactured  locally,  and  OGL
imports  represented  only  about  30%  of  total  capital  goods  imports  in  1987/88.
Second,  most  imports  of  capital  goods  continue  to  require  the  clearance  of  the
Capital  Goods  Committee.  Third,  the  increasingly  high  tariffs  levied  on
imported  capital  goods  (official  tariffs  in  1987/88  averaged  90%,  and  actual
collection  rates  averaged  62.5%)  have  successfully  substituted  for  the- 35  -
reduction  in  QRs  in  ensuring  that  domestic  production  would  supply  an
increasing  share  of  total  demand  for  capital  goods.  Table  18  presents  the
general  trends  in  foreign  trade  for  capital  goods.
TABLE  18:  TRENDS  IN FOREIGN  TRADE  OF CAPITAL  GOODS (X)
1973174 1978179 1980/81 1984185  1986/87 1987/88
CIF  Imports  as  ---  ---  14.4  13.3  18.6  16.6
X  GFCF in  Hachinery
Duties  as X Imports  37.4  49.4  49.1  75.2  59.8  65.4
Imports  as Z  Output  35.9  17.1  17.4  20.5  --  24.9
Exports  as Z Output  5.9  6.2  4.4  3.8  ---  2.8
Excise as Z  Output  1.5  3.2  ---  ---  ---  7.4
Distribution  of Imports  by Regime:
- OGL  27.0
- Limited Permissible  21.0
- Restricted  52.0
70.  Table  19  shows  the  trends  in  foreign  trade  for  disaggregated  components
of  capital  goods.  The  table  shows  that  the  structure  of  trade  in  1978/79
indicated  the  beginning  of  specialization  along  the  lines  of  comparative
advantage  and  technological  achievement.  For  example,  import  and  export
shares  were  respectively  43%  and  13%  for  machine  tools  and  82%  and  15%  for
general  electrical  machinery.  In  these  two  groups,  India  was  importing  what
it  could  not  produce  adequately,  and  was  exporting  products  where  it  had  a
comparative  advantage.  In  most  countries  with  developed  capital  goods
industries,  shares  of  both  imports  and  exports  are  very  large.  India  in
1978/79  was  closer  to  these  countries.  However,  this  tentative  and  partial
specialization  disappeared  during  the  1980s  as  the  result  of  policies  for
increased  self-sufficiency  which  lowered  not  only  imports  but  also  exports.- 36 -
TABLE  19:  PATTERII  OF EXTERNAL  TRADE  FOR CAPITAL  GOODS
(as  X of  Dmomtic  Output)
1978179  1980/81  1984185  1987188
Import  EZDort  Imaort  Ezvort  Imvort  ExPort  ImDort  Export
Non-Electrical  Machin.  27.5  6.2  30.3  5.9  34.2  5.6  22.3  3.9
Machine-Tools  43.2 13.3  35.8  8.4  28.2  4.0  17.5  5.8
Electrical  Machinery  9.4  6.3  4.5  2.1  6.9  1.8  7.1  1.2
General  Machinery  81.7 14.8  44.4  0  25.6  0  31.1  5.5
Transport  Equipment  3.7  1.6  8.6  2.8  6.5  1.0  12.8  1.2
TOTAL  Capital  Goods  17.1  5.4  17.4  4.0  20.5  3.6  14.9/a 2.5
/a  Excluding  Project  Importp.  If  included,  this  ratio  would  increase  to  24.92.
In  conclusion,  India  increased  its  self-reliance  in  capital  goods  by
increasing  its  protection,  but  it  lost  the  advantages  of  specialization  and
most  of  its  export  potential.
71.  Nominal  and  Effective  Protection.  Price  comparisons  (NPRs)  for  capital
goods  and  machinery  indicate  that  the  tariff  levels  exceed  what  would  be
required  to  provide  protection  to  the  domestic  industry.17/  Tables  20  and  21
show  the  nominal  protection  rates  for  a  sample  of  60  capital  goods.
TABLE  20s NOMINAL  PROTECTION  RATES  (NPRs)  FOR  CAPITAL  GOODS/a
Product  Group  X Sample  Overall  1989  1987
Non-Electrical  Machinery  54  180  197  172
Machine-Tools  24  157
Electrical  Industrial  Machinery  14  135
Electrical  Cables/Wires  3  120
Small  Telecommanications  Equip  5  121
Overall  (1t60  NPRs)  100  163
/a Plain  averages.
17/  The  samples  are  biased  towards  non-electrical  machinery.- 37  -
These  tables  also  show  the  wide  variation  in  nominal  and  effective  protection
rates.  The  range  and  medians  of  nominal  protection  for  output  and  inputs  and
of  effective  protection  are  given  below.  The  median  NPR  for  output  is  40%,
and  the  median  NPR  for  inputs  is  70%.  Effective  protection  ranges  from  -20%
to  585%,  with  the  median  at  about  30%.
TABIE  21s  RANGE  AND  MEDIAN  FOR NOMINAL  AND  EPPECTIVE  PROTECTION
(NPRs and  EPRs,  in  Z)
Range  Median
Nominal  Protectiont  Output  13  to  317  40
Input  25 to 226  70
Effective  Protection  -20  to 585  30
The  distribution  of  output  nominal  protection  is  largely  bimodal,  with  its
peak  in  the  30-50%  range.  By  contrast,  the  distribution  of  effective
protection  rates  is  unimodal,  with  a  first  peak  in  the  [-10,+10%]  range  and  a
second  peak  in  the  [30,50%]  range.  This  suggests  the  presence  of  at  least  two
different  groups of  capital  goods industries,  a first  group receiving  low or
negative protection  and a second  group receiving  effective  protection  similar
to other  manufacturing subsectors.
72.  Within  each product-group,  variations  in  nominal  and  effective
protection  can  be  wide  as  well.  In  the  machine-tools  subsector,  for  example,
there  are  two  district  groups.  Standard  lathes  and  machine-tools  have  output
price  ratios  (NPRs)  ranging  typically  between  1.15  and  1.50,  with  the  median
at  1.30.  High-technology  products,  such  as  CNC  machine-tools  and  NC  machining
centers,  have  domestic  prices  which  are  100%  or  more  above  international
prices  (NPR  above  2.0).
73.  There  appears  also  to  be  some  positive  correlation  between  the  level  of
technological  complexity and  the  degree  of  inefficiency  as measured  by the
Effective  Protection  rates  (EPR), at  least  for  those product-groups where
transfers  of  technology and foreign  collaborations  for  technology up-dating
have been low.  When  moving from  steel  structures  (simple  technology)  to
platework structures  (pressure vessels,  exchangers)  and to mining equipment,- 38  -
the  EPR  ranges  increase  by  30-40  percentage  points.  On  the  other  hand,  EPRs
appear  to  decline  when  moving  to  product-groups  requiring  higher  levels  of
technology  such  as  machine-tools  and  heavy  electrical  power  machinery.  These
latter  two  subsectors  have  been  among  those  which  Government  policies  have
allowed  to  maintain  an  open  access  to  foreign  technologies  and  collaborations
for  continuous  modernization  and  technology  updating.
TABLE  22:  RANGE  OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION.  BY TECMNOLOGICAL  LEVEL
Product-GrouD  Range  of  EPR (S)
Platework  -10  to  +77
Mining  Equipment  +33  to +135
Machine-Tools  -20  to +83
Electrical  Machinery  0 to +32
A  few  products  with  low  EPRs,  such  as  steel  structures  or  standard  machine-
tools  of  stable  technology,  are  produced  at  competitive  prices  (output  NPRs
range  between  1  and  1.10),  and  are  exported  whenever  inputs  are  supplied  at
world  prices.
74.  Firm  Efficiency  and  Effective  Support  Rates.  A  significant  share  of  the
products  analyzed  above  are  produced  by  CPEs  from  the  non-electrical  machinery
subsector.  Some  of  these  CPEs  have  in  fact  incurred  chronic  cash  losses
(before  depreciation)  covered  by  Government  advances  and  subsidies,  which  have
permitted  them  to  sell  at  market  prices  (dictated  by  the  competitive  domestic
market)  which  are  below  their  short-term  marginal  costs  (STMCs).  For  this
reason,  effective  protection  rates  do  not  provide  a  representative  measure  of
their  operating  efficiency.18/  A  more  adequate  measure  of  efficiency  is
provided  by  effective  support  rates  (ESRs),  which  add  to  the  value  added
permitted  by  the  trade  regime  the  amount  of  subsidies  supporting  the
18/  Another  reason  why  EPRs  would  not  adequately  measure  the  operating
efficiency  would  be  the  presence  of  high  profit  margins  reflecting
monopoly  rents  or  other  privileged  positions.  None  of  the  analyzed
enterprises  has  such  profit  margins.- 39  -
production  of  the  capital  goods.19/  Consequently,  the  data  above  have  been
adjusted  to  reflect  more  adequately  the  efficiency  of  the  firms  operating
under  the  common  incentive  framework  of  the  capital  goods  sector.  EPRs  of
cash-loss  CPEs  were  converted  into  ESRs  by  incorporating  an  estimated  cash-
loss  subsidy.20/
75.  The  results  are  summarized  by  the  distributions  of  ESRs  in  Figure  1.
The  median  effective  rate  of  support  is  about  40%. Again,  the  distribution  of
ESRs  is  bimodal,  with  a  first  peak  in  the  -10,  +10%  range  and  another  peak  in
the  30-50%  range.  However,  part  of  the  distribution  has  shifted  to  the  right
towards  higher  ESRs.
19/  By  definition,  ESR  =  (value  added  in  domestic  prices  plus  subsidies)/value
added  in  international  prices  minus  1. Given  that  some  CPES  of  the  sample
have  been  incurring  chronic  losses  and  that  the  policy  of  the  Government
has  been  to  keep  CPEs  operating  despite  their  losses,  the  subsidies  have
de  facto  represented  additional  incentive.  Adding  cash-loss  subsidies
to  output  value  and  to  value  added  at  domestic  prices  permits  to  compute
nominal  support  rates  (NSRs) and ESRs  based on short-term  marginal
costs.  A more correct  methodology would be to  estimate  ESRs  based on
long-term  marginal  costs  by adding  to  cash-loss  subsidies  the
opportunity  costs  of  the  capital  employed.
20/  Ideally,  the  ESR  should  incorporate  a  cash-loss  subsidy  specific  to  each
product.  Such product-specific  subsidies  are  not  available.  Assuming
that  selected  products  are  representative  of  the  enterprises'  product-
mix  and  operating  efficiency,  the  average  cash-loss  to  output  ratio  for
the  whole  enterprises  was  taken  as  a  first  proxy.- 40  -
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76.  Structure  of  Production Costs, by  Enterprise Groups  The analyses made
above indicate  that  the capital  goods  sector,  or  at  least  its  largest
subsector of  non-electrical  machinery, comprises  three  broad groups of
enterprises:
(a)  enterprises  receiving  incentives  for  operating  along  international
standards  of  practice,  with  EPRs  in  the  [-10O,  +10%]  range;
(b)  more  protected  enterprises,  enjoying  EPRs  in  the  [30%,  50%]  range;
and
(c)  CPEs  requiring  cash  subsidies  for  survival  and  operating  with  high
effective  support  rates.
The  basic  characteristics  of  the  three  groups  of  enterprises,  as  sumnarized  in
Tables  23  and  24,  indicate  that  each  of  these  groups  is  fairly  homogeneous
(particularly  the  first  two  groups)  and  has  its  own  distinct  parameters.- 41 -
TABIZ  233  BASIC  PARAMETERS  OF CAPITAL  GOODS  ENTPRISES
NPC  Support  Coefficients  VA/Output  (I)
Inout  Output  EPC  Nominal Effective  Int.  Prices  Dom.  Prices
t  Groups Average  1.69  1.31  1.01  n.a.  56  43
Median  1.65  1.33  1.02  n.a.  55  42
2nd  Group  Average  1.79  1.58  1.40  n.a.  55  58
Median  1.76  1.56  1.42  n.a.  56  51
d Group  Average  1.77  1.56  1.61  1.89  2.43  46  41
Median  1.76  1.47  1.22  1.72  1.62  40  39
TABLE  248  STRUCTURE  OF VALUE  ADDED  IN CAPITAL  GOODS  ENTERPRISES
(in  Z  of Output  Value in  Domestic  Prices)
Enterprise  Groups
Components  First  Second  Thirdla
Labor  15.0  20.0  29.0
Depreciation  5.0  4.0  4.0
Interest  6.5  8.5  13.5
/a  Average  structure  for  cash-losing  CPEs in  Capital  Goods.
77.  The  combination  of  these  various  sets  of  parameters  leads  to  the
following  three  basic  enterprise  models  which  represent  reasonably  well  the
three  groups  identified  earlier.- 42  -
TABLE 25:  PRODUCTION  COST STRUCTURES  OF CAPITAL GOODS  ENTERPRISES
(in  X  of  Output  in  World  Prices)
let  Group/a  2nd  Group/a  3rd  Group/a
Enterprise  I.P.  D.P.  NPC/EPC  I.P.  D.P.  NPC/EPC  I.P.  D.P.  NPC/EPC
Output  100  131  1.31  10J  157  1.57  100  150  1.50
Inputs: Materials  35  63  1.80  33  64  1.95  48.5  85  1.75
Services  10  13  1.30  45  16  1.30  11.5  15  1.30
Total  Inputs  45  76  1.70  45  80  1.78  60  100  1.75
Value  Added  55  55.0  1.00  55  77.0  1.40  40  50.0  1.25
Labor  19.5  31.5  43.5
Interest  8.5  13.5  20.5
Depreciation  6.5  6.5  6.0
Pre-Tax  Profit  20.5  25.5  -20.0
(Cash-Flow  Subsidy)  N.A.  N.A.  (14.0)
/a NPCs for  inputs  and outputs  and  EPCs for  value  added.
Notes:  I.P.:  in  International  Prices,  D.P.:  in  Domestic  Prices.
Table  25  shows  the  stylized  cost  structures  of  the  three  groups  of  enter-
prises  in  both  domestic  and  international  prices.  The  major  difference
between  the  first  group  of  efficient  firms  and  the  other  two  groups  is  in
labor  and  interest  costs. Labor  cost  difference  is  partially  caused  by
inefficient  technologies  and  partially  (especially  in  CPEs)  by  overstaffing.
Higher  interest  costs,  especially  in  the  third  group,  reflect  the  accumulated
losses  of  these  enterprises.
78.  Impact  of  Trade  Reform  on  Profitability  of  Capital  Goods  Industries.
The  liberalization  of  capital  goods  imports  and  the  progressive  dismantling  of
the  uneven  tariff  structure  will  have  different  impacts  on  the  viability  and
profitability  of  the  sector's  enterprises,  depending  on  the  type  of
enterprises  and  their  present  level  of  efficiency.  The  impact  of  trade
liberalization  is  dictated  primarily  by:  (a)  the  level  of  effective
protection/support  enjoyed  by  the  enterprise,  and  (b)  the  breakdown  of  the
enterprise's  value  added  between  different  cost  components  (labor,  interest,
depreciation)  and  gross  profit.
79.  Assuming  a  general  trade  reform,  i.e.,  removal  of  QRs  and  progressive
reduction  of  tariffs  to  free-trade  over  five  periods  (which  could  be  five
years),  the  nominal  protection  for  capital  goods  and  the  resulting  output- 43 -
price  ratios  which  the  three  enterprise  groups  would  have  to  compete  with,  are
given  in  Table  26.21/
TABLE 26t  EVOLUTION  OF CAPITAL GOODS  RELATIVE  PRICES UNDER  FREE-TRADE  REGIME
Present Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5
Average  Actual  Tariff  (Z)  75  50  37.5  25  12.5  0
Relative  Output  Prices:
1st  Group  1.31  1.31  1.25  1.25  1.125  1.00
2nd  Group  1.57  1.50  1.375  1.25  1.125  1.00
3rd  Group  1.50  1.50  1.375  1.25  1.125  1.00
It  is  assumed  that:  (i)  the  average  tariffs  actually  collected  on  imported
capital  goods  would  be  unified  and,  after  an  initial  reduction  of  25
percentage  points  in  the  first  year,  reduced  over  5  years  to  zero:  and
11)  that  the  present  conditions  of  local  competition  would  continue  to
prevail,  thus  keeping  current  prices  at  their  present  levels  until  the  lowered
tariffs  start  "biting"  and  force  enterprises  to  adjust  prices  downwards  to
international  levels.  It  is  also  assumed  that  protective  tariffs  on  materials
and other  physical  inputs  would,  under the  general  tariff  reform,  be gradually
reduced to  zero,  and reduction  on input  costs  would begin  in  the  first  year  of
reform  program.  Table  27  presents  the  likely  outcomes  of  the  reform  program,
on the  three  groups of  enterprises,  without  any enterprise  structuring  or
efficiency  improvements.
21/  The sequencing presented  here  is  purely  illustrative.  It  is  possible  to
design  alternative  phasing  options.- 44  -
TABLE  273  TRADE  REFORM  SCENARIO  FOR THREE GROWUPS  OF CAPITAL GOODS  PRODUCTS
(in  Z of  World  Output  Prices)
Present  Year 1  Year  2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5
GROUP  1
Output  131  131  131  125  112.5  100
Inputs:  Materials  63  57.5  52  46.5  41  35
Services  13  13  13  13  13  13
Total  76  70.5  65  59.5  54  48
Value  Added  55  60.5  66  65.5  58.5  52
Labor  19.5  ---------------- Unchanged---------------
Interest  8.5  ---------------- Unchanged--
Depreciation  6.5  ---------------- Unchanged---------------
Pre-Tax  Profit  20.5  26.0  31.5  31.0  24.0  17.5
(as  X  of Output'  15.6  19.8  24.0  24.8  21.3  17.5
GROUP  2
Output  157  150  137.5  125  112.5  100
Inputss  Materials  64  58  52  46  40  33
Services  16  16  16  16  16  16
Total  80  74  68  62  56  49
Value  Added  77  76  69.5  63  56.5  51
Labor  31.5  ---------------- Unchanged---------------
Interest  13.5  -----  Unchanged---------------
Depreciation  6.5  ---------------- Unchanged---------------
Pre-Tax  Profit  25.5  24.5  18.0  11.5  5.0  -0.5
(as  I  of Output)  16.2  16.3  13.1  9.2  4.4  -0.5
GROUP  3
Output  150  150  137.5  125  112.5  100
Inputst  Materials  85  77.5  70  62.5  55  48.5
Services  15  15  15  15  15  15
Total  100  92.5  85  77.5  70  63.5
Value  Added  50  57.5  52.5  47.5  42.5  36.5
Labor  43.5  --  - Unchanged---------------
Interest  20.5  ---------------- Unchanged---------------
Depreciation  6  -----  -Unchanged---------------
Pre-Tax  Profit  -20.0  -12.5  -17.5  -22.5  -27.5  -33.5
Memo Item:  Cash-Flow  Subsidy  (14.0)  (6.5)  (11.5)  (16.5)  (21.5)  (27.5)
80.  Due to  the  one-two year  time  lag  between the  binding  impact  of  the
respective  tariff  reductions  on output  and inputs,  the  profitability  of
*unprotected*  firms  (Ist  Group) increases  during  the  first  three  years  before
reaching  a  level  that  is  higher  than  they  currently  enjoy/.  Similarly,  the- 45 -
cash-losing  enterprises  (3rd Group) see a temporary decrease in  their  losses
during the  first  two years before their  losses and the corresponding subsidies
increase  markedly;  they  should  use  this  two-year  respite  for  restructuring
purposes.  The  second  group  of  enterprises  has  its  high  profitability  eaten  up
as  of  the  first  year  by  the  lowering  of  its  output  protection,  down  to  a
slightly  negative  profitability.  The  following  table  summarizes  the  results
of  Table  27.
TABLE  28s  PROFITABILITY  OF CAPITAL  GOODS  ENTERPRISES  UNDER  TRADE  REFORM
(Pre-Tax  Profit  to Output  Value,  In 2)
Present  Year  1  Year 2  Year  3  Year 4  Year 5
1st  Group  15.6  19.8  24.0  24.8  21.3  17.5
2nd  Group  16.2  16.3  13.1  9.2  4.4  -0.5
3rd  Group  -13.3  -8.3  -12.7  -18.0  -24.4  -33.5
(Cash  Subsidy)  (9.3)  (4.3)  (8.4)  (13.2)  (19.1)  (27.5)
81.  Restructurina  Scenarios  for  Maintained  Production22/  The  existing
enterprises  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  groups  would  have  to  undertake  restructuring
measures,  focused primarily  on  their  labor  costs  and  on  and  interest  charges,
if  they  are  to  restore  their  profitability  rates  (2nd group) or  at  least
operate  without  Government  cash subsidies  (3rd  group).  Achieving  a  profit
rate  of  17.5%  in  the  2nd  group,  (the  profitability  level  of  the  1st  group)
would  require  cutting  down  primarily  on  labor  costs.  In  order  to  alleviate
somewhat  the  socially  painful  labor  adjustment,  interest  charges  could  also  be
reduced  to  a  level  similar  to  that  in  the  1st  group  enterprises.  The
resulting  production  cost  structure  would  evolve  as  follows:
22/  The  following  paragraphs  are  considering  restructuring  scenarios  in
those  cases  where  separate  enterprise-specific  diagnoses  have  concluded
about  the  economic  undesirability  to  expand  or  diversify  the  production
capacity  of  the  enterprise  under  review.  In  many  cases,  however,  the
diagnosis  would  be  to  expand  some  of  the  existing  production  lines
and/or  open  new  ones,  with  additional  investments  to  be  carefully
identified  and  assessed  by  enterprise  restructuring  programs.  Such  cases
of  expanded/diversified  production  fall  outside  the  purpose  of  this
note,  which  addresses  essentially  the  case  of  enterprises  which  are  in  a
position  to  consider  only  two  options:  (a)  How  to  keep  their  existing
production  lines  operating  profitably  under  the  new  protection
framework,  without  substantial  new  investments;  (b)  or  close  down.- 46  -
TABLE  29s  RESTRUCTURING  SCENARIO  FOR  EtISTING  XNTRRPRISES  OF THE 2ND GROUP
(in  Z of  World  Output  Price)
Present  Year  1  Year 2  Year  S  Year 4  Year 5
Value  Added  77  76  69.5  63  56.5  51
Labor  31.5  31.5  28.7  24.9  21.0  19.5
Depreciation  6.5  ----------------- Unchanged---------------
Interest  13.5  13.5  11.5  10.5  9.5  8.5
Pre-Tax  Profit  25.5  24.5  22.8  21.1  19.5  17.5
(asZ  Output  Value)  16.2  16.3  16.6  16.9  17.2  17.5
Interest  charges  need  be  reduced  by  about  one-third,  and  labor  costs  would
have  to  be  cut  by  more  than  one-third  (about  38%  of  their  present  level).  The
adjustment  costs  for  these  enterprises  would  be  substantial,  but  manageable.
82.  The  cash-losing  CPEs  constitute  a  more  difficult  case  for  restructuring.
Firstly,  an  in-depth  and  targeted  approach  should  be  taken,  whereby  a
comprehensive  diagnosis  of  each  enterprise/plant  situation  and  potential23/
should  be  carried  out  and  lead  to  enterprise-specific  restructuring  plans
considering  three  alternative  decisions:
(a) invest  for  long-term  rehabilitation  and/or  capacity  expansion;
(b) keep  open  and  operate  in  the  short-run  with  working  capital;  or
(c) disinvest/close  unproductive  assets  through  simplified  bankruptcy  and
exit  procedures.
Those  units  assessed  to  remain  potentially  uneconomic  should  exit.  Restruc-
turing  plans  for  the  other  units  would  be  developed,  which  would  involve
strategic  decisions  on  trimming  unprofitable  product  lines,  physical  and
financial  restructuring,  labor  shedding  and  improved  management.
23/  The  diagnosis  and  restructuring  plans  should  assess  over  the  short  and
medium-term  each  enterprise's  situation  and  prospect  regarding  markets,
competitiveness,  product-mix,  organizational  and  corporate  structure,
labor  force,  investments,  financial  structure,  and  financial  and
economic  viability.- 47  -
83.  The  minimal  objective  of  achieving  a zero  ofit  in  those  units  to  be
kept  open  for  continuing  operation  (without  major  new  investments)  would
require:
(i)  financial  restructuring  at  the  outset  with  a  view  to  reduce
financial  charges  to  a level  close  to  that  in  other  enterprises,
primarily  through  partial  write-off  of  the  debt  owned  to  the
Government;  and
(1t) substantial  reduction  of  labor  costs  through  early  retirement
schemes  and  other  means  of  shedding  excess  labor.
The  restructuring  scenario  could  be  as  follows:
TABLE  30s  RESTRUCTURING  SCENARIO  FOR CASH-LOSING  ENTERPRISES (3rd  GROUP)
(as  X  of World  Output  Price)
Present  Year 1  Year 2  Year  3  Year 4  Year  5
Value  Added  50  57.5  52.5  47.5  42.5  36.5
Depreciation  6  ---- Unchanged----------------
Interest  20.5  15.5  14.0  12.5  11.0  9.5
Labor  43.5  39.0  34.5  30.0  25.5  21.0
Pre-Tax  Profit  -20.0  -3.0  -2.0  -1.0  0  0
Cash  Subsidy  14.0  --  --  -- 
Cash-Flow  -14.0  3.0  4.0  5.0  6.0  6.0
Interest  charges  would  be  reduced  initially  by  one-fourth  (through  a first
debt  write-off)  and  subsequently  by  another  one-third.  Labor  costs  would  have
to  be  reduced  by  more  than  half  to  about  48%  of  their  present  level.  The
restructuring  programs  would  have  to  balance  and  arbitrate  between  debt  write-
off  and  labor  shedding:  the  more  debt  written-off,  the  less  labor  shedding
required.
84.  These  results  clearly  indicate  that  significant  restructuring  is
necessary  to  achieve  a  competitive  and  efficient  capital  goods  industry.  The
scenarios  developed  here  have  focused  primarily  on  the  negative  effects  of
trade  reform  and  on  enterprises  that  are  likely  to  be  negatively  affected.  It
is  equally  likely  that  most  of  the  efficient  enterprises  would  expand  their
markets,  both  internal  and  external.  Furthermore,  domestic  demand  for  capital
goods  would  expand  with  the  decrease  in  its  relative  price. Real  devaluations- 48  -
that  are  likely  to  accompany  the  proposed  reforms  would  also  minimize  some  of
the  adjustment  costs.  Therefore,  the  net  effects  are  likely  to  be  less
negative  than  outlined  above.
E. CONCLUSIONS
85.  The  policy  of  high  taxes  and  tariffs  on  capital  goods  and  key
intermediates  have  escalated  the  costs  of  production  in  India  across  a  wide
spectrum  of  industries.  At  the  same  time,  this  structure  of  protection  has
led  to  much  lower  net  average  protection  to  the  industrial  sector  as  a  whole.
However,  it  has  created  tremendous  unplanned  variance  in  net  EPRs  where  half
the  industry  receives  highly  positive  while  the  other  half  receives  highly
negative  net  EPRs.  The  policy  of  keeping  landed  price  of  imports  (especially
for  intermediates)  higher  than  domestic  prices  also  has  induced  domestic  firms
to  enter  these  areas  irrespective  of  considerations  of  comparative  advantage
and  international  competitiveness.  These  uneconomic  investments  in  turn
generate  further  tariff  escalation5  and  higher  costs  of  production  for  all
downstream  Industries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  deregulation  of  industry
through  excess  entry  and  creation  of  supply  surpluses  has  tended  to  lower  the
EPRs.  The  deregulation  seems  to  have  greater  impact  primarily  on  some
consumer  and  capital  goods.  However,  in  intermediates  and  other  capital
goods,  domestic  competition  does  not  seem  to  have  achieved  the  same
results.24/  First,  India  is  still  a  large  net  importer  of  these  products  and
will  be  so  for  some  time  to  come.  Second,  rapid  growth  in  manufacturing  (due
to  deregulation  and  excessive  domestic  demand)  have  led  to  growing  imports
despite  rapid  growth  of  domestic  supply  of  intermediates.  Third,  these
sectors  are  highly  capital  intensive  which  makes  entry  more  difficult  and  many
of  these  products  are  licenced  tightly  and/or  reserved  for  public  sector.
What  is  needed  in  these  sectors  is  more  import  competition  and  across  the
board  tariff  and  tax  reductions;  which  would  lower  the  costs  of  production  for
all  downstream  industries.
24/  Recent  productivity  growth  studies  have  corroborated  this  observation.
According  to  these  estimates,  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  has
increased  dramatically  during  the  1980s.  However,  the  TFP  growth  has
been  lowest  for  intermediates;  1.4X  p.a.  for  intermediate  goods  versus
about  6X  p.a.  for  consumer  goods  and  3.4X  for  capital  goods  (Ahluwalia,
1991).- 49  -
86.  Import  substitution  in  intermediates  has  been  complicated  by  the
response  of  Government  to  international  price  fluctuations.  By  the  nature  of
world  markets,  international  prices  of  intermediates  such  as  steel  or
chemicals,  are  highly  cyclical.  In  the  name  of  price  stability,  the  Indian
Government  adjusts  tariffs  and  QRs  to  maintain  the  high  protection  in  the
economy.  When  international  prices  rise,  the  tariffs  are  sometimes  maintained
for  revenue  purposes;  leading  to  the  ratcheting  up  of  tariffs.  On  the  other
hand,  when  world  prices  decline,  tariffs  are  raised.  This  leaves  the
exporters  (which  are  mostly  downstream  industries)  with  much  higher  costs  than
their  foreign  competitors  that  have  access  to  cheaper  raw  materials.21/  This
is  what  happened  to  engineering  industries  in  the  early  1980s  when  world  steel
prices  collapsed.  More  recently,  decline  in  international  aluminum  prices
have  led  to  a  similar  adjustment  where  aluminum  was  moved  from  OGL  to  the
Restricted  list;  leading  exporters  of  aluminum  products  to  ask  for  IPRS
benefits.  A  similar  danger  awaits  users  of  petrochemical  products  if  the
existing  high  world  prices  decline.  It  is  very  important  that  domestic
producers  of  key  intermediates  be  induced  to  adjust  to  international  price
fluctuations  to  maintain  the  competitiveness  of  the  rest  of  the  economy.
87.  It  also  appears  literally  impossible  to  bring  Indian  prices  closer  to
world  levels  without  substantially  lowering  the  costs  of  investment.  Most  of
Indian  industries  are  in  need  of  modernization  and  would  need  significant
investments  to  expand  exports  and  meet  growing  domestic  demand.  Investments
made  with  existing  high  capital  costs  will  permanently  handicap  these
industries  relative  to  their  competitors.
88.  Given  the  magnitude  and  variance  of  effective  protection  rates  it  is
clear  that  anything  short  of  low  and  uniform  tariffs  and  complete  elimination
of  QRs  would  not  bring  transparency  to  the  incentive  regime  faced  by  the
industrial  sector.  The  evidence  suggests  that  there  is  ample  scope  for
significant  reductions  in  tariffs  and  QRs  and  most  industries  can  coexist  with
much  less  protection  than  currently  given.  The  elimination  of  all  surcharges
on  inputs  (tariffs  on  imported  inputs,  price  differentials  on  local  ones,  non-
deductible  excise  taxes)  indicates  that,  even  without  correcting  for  the
21/  In  theory,  export  compensation  systems  should  automatically  adjust  for
price  differentials,  but  this  rarely  happens  in  practice.- 50  -
effects  of  high  investment  costs,  most  projects  (including  the  import-
substitution  ones)  would  earn  from  the  current  international  prices  a  positive
profit  margin  on  their  marginal  as  well  as  full  production  costs.  The  propor-
tion  of  projects  with  such  a  positive  profit  margin  would  triple  from  20%  to
63%.  Among  the  import-substituting  projects  which  have  no  prospects  nor
potential  for  export  under  the  present  trade  regime,  this  proportion  wo:'ld
increase  dramatically  from  0  to  50%  if  they  could  procure  their  inputs  at
international  prices  (Ettori,  1990).
89.  The  lower  tariffs  would  fulfill  more  effectively  their  primary  purpose
of  providing  protection  and  incentive  signals,  and  disregard  their  secondary
function  of  public  revenue  generation  which  in  India  has  become  predominant
and  introduced  pervasive  distortions  in  prices  and  incentives.  The  function
of  public  revenue  generation,  which  is  currently  another  critical  issue  in
India,  should  be  fulfilled  by  other  more  efficient  and  protection-neutral
instruments,  in  particular  direct  taxation  (income  tax)  and  non-tariff
indirect  taxation  (neutral  excise  taxes,  MODVAT,  and  preferably  the
consumption  VAT).REFERENCES
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